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Abstract
Modern society depends on critical infrastructure (CI) managed by Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs). PLCs depend on firmware, though firmware security
vulnerabilities and contents remain largely unexplored. Attackers are acquiring the
knowledge required to construct and install malicious firmware on CI. To the defender,
firmware reverse engineering is a critical, but tedious, process.
This thesis applies machine learning algorithms, from the file carving and malware
identification fields, to firmware reverse engineering, then characterizes the algorithms’
performance. This research describes a process to speed and simplify PLC firmware
analysis, and implements that process with the cross-platform Firmware Disassembly
System. The system partitions a firmware into segments, labels each segment with a file
type, determines the target architecture of code segments, then disassembles and performs
rudimentary analysis on the code segments. This research characterizes the performance
of file carving algorithms applied to the file type identification problem, and of malware
identification algorithms applied to the architecture identification problem.
This research discusses the system’s accuracy on a set of pseudo-firmwares. Of the
algorithms it considers, the combination of a byte-frequency file carving algorithm and a
support vector machine (SVM) algorithm using information gain (IG) for feature selection
achieve the best performance. That combination correctly identifies the file types of 57.4%
of non-code bytes, and the architectures of 85.3% of code bytes.
Finally, the system performs opcode frequency analysis on disassembly results. This
research analyzes the opcode frequencies of four common PLC processor architectures.
Opcode frequency analysis provides analysts a measure of disassembly correctness. This
research applies the Firmware Disassembly System to several real-world firmwares, and
discusses the contents.
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FILE CARVING AND MALWARE IDENTIFICATION ALGORITHMS APPLIED TO
FIRMWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) quietly manage dozens of systems that
modern society depends on every day. PLCs, in turn, depend on firmware. Firmware is a
black box to control system operators, as they have no control or knowledge of its contents.
Though largely ignored in the past, recent security research focuses on firmware [69–73].
Researchers now routinely find remotely-exploitable PLC firmware bugs.
Few published efforts reveal PLC internals. Schwartz et al. focus on the
hardware internals [58], Peck and Peterson manually reverse engineer two firmwares but
their discussion does not focus on firmware contents [48], and McMinn considers the
communications protocols PLCs use to update firmware [41]. Manufacturers consider
many specifications proprietary, including processor architecture, and in most cases devices
are too expensive or mission critical to disassemble.
The networked generation of Industrial Control System (ICS) hardware enables
operators to make economic decisions which compromise system security. Operators
connect their critical infrastructure (CI) systems to their business networks to enable
improved customer service or less expensive long distance control. Attacking ICSs once
required a sophisticated, well-financed attacker. Recent high-profile incidents, like that
which pr0f srs claimed in 2011, show that ICS attacks no longer require many resources
[53]. More sophisticated attacks like Stuxnet now target PLCs specifically, but have
not yet attacked or modified PLC firmware [11]. History shows that these attacks are
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likely coming. Open-source firmware projects for wireless routers [45, 63] and music
players [64], and published modifications of other firmware [19, 43], indicate that even
unsophisticated attackers will perpetrate PLC firmware attacks.
Once a system operator discovers that an attacker compromised their device, they
must determine the extent and effect of that compromise. Analysis requires a measure
of firmware reverse engineering. Unfortunately firmware is a black box to the user and
a proprietary, undocumented, binary blob to the researcher. Header format is arbitrary,
and varies between manufacturer and even model. Devices may reorder or uncompress
sections at several times, and may load code segments with arbitrary offsets. Devices
may skip installing firmware sections based upon hardware configuration. These device
activities complicate analysis, because firmware images retrieved with chip debugging tools
differ from pristine firmware images. Fortunately, manufacturers do not seem to purposely
obfuscate firmwares.
1.2 Purpose and Goals
The reverse engineering process is tedious [3]. It requires detailed analysis even
before disassembling code segments. Consequently, few analyses of PLC firmwares
exist, academic or otherwise. This research effort’s goal is to automate firmware reverse
engineering. Specifically, this research automates the steps of reverse engineering prior to
code analysis. It characterizes the performance of file carving and malware identification
algorithms when applied to firmware reverse engineering. This paper describes the
steps of firmware reversing, describes an implementation of those steps in the Firmware
Disassembly System, characterizes the system’s performance, and presents some PLC
firmware disassembly results.
Until recently, little need existed for efficient PLC firmware reverse engineering.
Forensics teams did not require the capability, and researchers had luck discovering
security vulnerabilities with externally-applied techniques like fuzzing [16]. Slow reverse
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engineering methods sufficed for the patient researcher. This requirement changed with the
proliferation of Internet connectivity for attackers and CI alike.
The Firmware Disassembly System simplifies firmware reverse engineering. Firm-
wares often include compressed segments [48], and the system finds and uncompresses
those. Complex firmwares often include web-server functionality including documenta-
tion or status outputs, so the system identifies likely data segments containing common
file types. The Firmware Disassembly System finds segments containing executable code,
identifies the target architecture and disassembles that code, then performs rudimentary
analysis on the result.
This research hypothesizes that of the three file type identification algorithms it
considers, Axelsson’s normalized compression distance (NCD) algorithm provides the
most accurate type identification [7]. Axelsson’s experimental configuration involves more
file types than the other researchers’, and his n-valued classification results showed greater
accuracy, for several file types, than the other algorithms.
Of the two code segment architecture classification algorithms this research considers,
it hypothesizes that Kolter and Maloof’s boosted decision tree algorithm provides the most
accurate architecture and endianness detection [35]. In three out of four experimental
configurations, boosted decision trees provide the most accurate malware classification.
In the fourth configuration boosted decision trees provide the second most accurate
classification. support vector machines (SVMs) produce the second most accurate
classification when averaged over the four configurations.
1.3 Summary of Contributions and Organization
Table 1.1 summarizes this research’s contributions. Chapter 2 discusses the security
problems that motivate this research, and related work. Next, Chapter 3 concerns testing
methodology and system implementation. Chapter 4 discusses test results, and investigates
the reason for those results. Finally, Chapter 5 provides closing discussion.
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Table 1.1: Summary of contributions
Contribution Relevant Section Related Work
Survey of related work Chapter 2 Academic: [9, 46]
Pseudo-firmware construction method Section 3.4
Firmware disassembly toolkit
construction
Section 3.7
Evaluation of file segmenting algorithms Section 4.1 Academic: [15, 33,
44]
File carving algorithm application to
firmware, and evaluation
Section 4.3 Academic: [5, 7,
12, 15, 23, 32, 33,
36, 38, 40, 44, 52,
60, 67, 74, 80]
Non-academic: [81]
Evaluation of malware classification
algorithm applied to
architecture-classification problem
Section 4.3 Academic: [35]
Opcode frequency analysis Section 4.5
PLC firmware content analysis Section 4.6 Academic: [18, 25,
79]
Non-academic: [19,
28, 29, 43]
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2 Background
This chapter provides an overview of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) technology and its components. It discusses existing threats to SCADA
infrastructure, then discusses known and theoretical attacks against SCADA. The chapter
then provides a basic overview of device firmware. It considers firmware’s function and
complexity, then discusses firmware attacks. Finally, this chapter provides an overview of
related research including firmware analysis in other fields, research into file carving, and
compiled code architecture classification efforts.
2.1 SCADA
SCADA systems, and more generally ICS networks, control and monitor a diverse set
of modern industrial processes. Services including gas and electricity distribution, water
and wastewater control, telecommunications, and food processing rely on these systems to
provide a modern level of performance [8]. These processes are too complex to monitor and
control economically without automation techniques. SCADA and ICS systems make these
processes feasible by gathering data from remote sites, then correlating and displaying it at
an operator terminal. SCADA systems first came into prominence in the 1960’s and have
since evolved, along with computing itself [39].
SCADA systems are a part of the United States CI as Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD)-63 defined in 1998 [13]. CI includes public and private “physical and cyber-
based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government”.
The directive acknowledges that in the past these systems were separate and independent,
but recent automation and interconnection introduced vulnerabilities. PDD-63, and the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 in 2003 [10], establish United States (US)
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policy regarding CI security. This section describes changes in SCADA infrastructure over
the years, and their motivation.
2.1.1 Monolithic Architecture
Initially, SCADA systems worked independently and in isolation, in a configuration
similar to server mainframes. These characteristics defined the monolithic phase of
SCADA architecture because one central unit, the SCADA Master, provided all computing
and monitoring functionality [39].
The lack of widespread networks and networking standards required every manufac-
turer to develop a proprietary system. Generally, the protocols did not tolerate other net-
work traffic and were not easily extensible. Manufacturers designed and installed each
SCADA system uniquely. The proprietary nature of the system software, networking, and
even the connectors, required the manufacturer to perform most system modifications.
Monolithic systems provided fault tolerance through SCADA Master redundancy. A
secondary system duplicated all functions of the primary, and monitored the primary’s
operation. When the secondary detected a fault it took over all operations. In general, the
secondary greatly increased system cost but performed little work.
2.1.2 Distributed Architecture
In the late 1980’s personal computers became more affordable, and local area network
(LAN) protocols became more standardized. These changes enabled SCADA architectures
that distributed operator functionality and processing across multiple systems. Individual
computers acted as human-machine interface (HMI) stations, as historian computers, and
in many other roles [39].
While manufacturers used standard LAN technologies to connect operator stations,
these networks had limited range. Many industrial processes still required communications
between geographically scattered equipment. Manufacturers continued to use proprietary
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protocols developed during the monolithic architecture phase, and their makeshift wide
area networks (WANs) were effectively single-use.
Distributed architecture SCADA systems only contained vendor-provided equipment.
Often, only the vendor could perform system maintenance and upgrades. The distributed
architecture enabled more flexible and economical fault tolerance, however. Often, other
system components could handle the operations of failed system components in addition
to their own tasks. Thus, distributed architecture systems did not require full-time standby
systems.
2.1.3 Networked Architecture
Finally, in the mid 1990’s manufacturers began to use largely commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) networking hardware and computer systems. They began to standardize
protocols for end-devices like PLCs and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), which enabled
protocol transport over standard WAN networks. Standard protocols enabled companies to
make in-house modifications to their SCADA networks, and to lower costs by leveraging
their existing network infrastructure [39].
The networked SCADA architecture gave organizations greater flexibility in their
operations. Connection with the business network for performance tracking and billing
purposes became simple [39]. Networked architectures also enabled off-site backup
and fault-tolerance, enabling systems with the ability to survive disasters affecting entire
geographical regions.
For all the benefits, the networked generation created new issues regarding system
security and reliability. Unexpected interaction between SCADA and business systems
caused reliability issues. Manufacturers’ use of standard network protocols lowered the bar
to system exploitation, and integrating CI and business network infrastructure expanded the
potential attack surface-area [39].
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2.1.4 Network Composition
SCADA networks have a hierarchical structure, as Figure 2.1 shows. Sensors and
actuators comprise the lowest level, and the sensor network connects them to PLCs and
RTUs. Sensor network connections are generally short, and analog. PLCs and RTUs
consolidate control over the sensors and actuators, then SCADA master units control the
PLCs and RTUs via the field network. Field networks consist of longer-distance links than
the sensor network. Modern field networks consist of Ethernet, serial cable, microwave
radio, telephone, and many other connections [8].
The control centers provide centralized operator control over the system, and include
terminals such as HMIs and data historians. Respectively, these enable operator control
over a physical process, and long term system state storage. Modern control centers consist
of COTS computer and networking hardware, running COTS operating systems and custom
control software. For example, Siemens’ SIMATIC WinCC product supports several
operating systems, from Microsoft Windows XP through Windows 7 [59]. SIMATIC
WinCC is Siemens’ primary control system software product, and Siemens is one of the
largest ICS manufacturers [58].
Increasingly, companies connect control centers to their business networks. Generally
they make this connection through a COTS firewall. Business network connections
enable companies to manage expenses and billing in real time, and to save costs by
leveraging existing long-distance network connections. These connections also introduce
vulnerabilities into the control system because many business networks have connections
to external networks like the Internet.
2.1.5 PLC Composition
The general PLC hardware architecture is modular, with some PLCs permitting end-
user module configuration, and others permitting only manufacturer configuration [58].
Modules communicate via the backplane and include processor, communications, and
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Figure 2.1: Example SCADA network diagram
input/output (I/O) modules. The processor module executes ladder-logic code to manage
physical processes, coordinates between the other modules, and even handles simple field
network communications if the PLC does not include a communications module. As such,
the processor module is generally the most complex.
The communications module is of similar complexity to the processor. The module
handles time-sensitive network communications, and frees the processor module to manage
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time-sensitive physical processes [58]. Communications modules handle multiple types of
network communications, including Internet Protocol (IP) over Ethernet and RS-422.
I/O modules output and input analog signals based upon commands from the processor
module [58]. These modules read gauges and switch positions, and control motors and
solenoids. I/O modules require the least intelligence, as their function is to process simple
backplane commands and manage digital/analog conversion hardware.
All three PLC modules contain microprocessors, and the most common processor
architectures are ARM, Motorola 68000 and PowerPC [58]. The processors execute code
contained in PLC firmware, and generally stored in nonvolatile flash memory. Additionally,
the processors interpret operator instructions regarding physical processes. Proprietary
software derives the instructions from one of the simple programming languages defined in
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61131-3 [31]. The specification defines
the Ladder Diagram, Function Block Diagram, Structured Text, and Instruction List
languages. Operators commonly call instructions in these languages ladder-logic.
2.1.6 Threats
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines five groups of cyber threats,
depicted below in order of increasing consequence and decreasing threat frequency [17].
Nuisance hackers comprise the overwhelming majority of cyber attacks and include groups
such as hacktivists, individuals that use cyber action as a form of protest or to achieve
political ends [56]. Despite the group’s lack of resources and the general low complexity of
their attacks, nuisance hacker attacks occasionally cause significant economic consequence
[42]. Notoriety, mischief, or publicity for a cause frequently motivate nuisance hackers.
Money motivates criminals and gangs, who have resources which enable attacks of greater
complexity than nuisance hackers. The DHS list of cyber threats is:
1. Nuisance Hackers
2. Criminals and Gangs
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3. Nation-States Motivated by Theft
4. Limited Resource Nation-States and Terrorists
5. Unlimited Resource Nation-States
Threat groups three through five possess significantly more resources [17]. Each has
the ability to seize control, through force, of corporations which produce cyber technology.
Military concerns motivate each, and economic and diplomatic concerns motivate all but
terrorists. Group three includes nation-states that steal private intellectual property and
national secrets. This threat group’s actors are unwilling to cause physical damage with
their actions, though they possess that capability. The limited and unlimited resource
groups are willing to cause physical damage. Money, time, or technical access may limit
the limited resource actors. Unlimited resource actors attack with monetary resources,
technical access, and speed, that overwhelm any adversary.
Attacks on the older, distributed architecture, SCADA systems, require physical
access and special network equipment. These requirements demand a moderate amount
of attacker resources. Attacks demand long-term planning, and that reduces attack payoff.
Modern networked SCADA systems lower the bar to attacker entry. Their connections
to the Internet, and use of common network protocols, enable nuisance hacker attacks.
Search engines like SHODAN make searching for Internet-facing SCADA networks simple
[68]. SHODAN and tools like Metasploit and THC-Hydra enable nuisance hacker
SCADA HMI attacks.
System operators can recognize many simple cyber attacks by their immediate system
effects, but the term advanced persistent threat (APT) describes a more insidious attacker
[66]. Long term reconnaissance and data exfiltration characterize the APT. These
actions require more resources than nuisance hackers possess, and until recently required
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more resources than criminals possessed. The proliferation of network attack tools and
knowledge enables organized criminals to act as APTs.
The insider threat and self-inflicted malfunction form a sixth threat category [62].
Insiders are employees and business associates that intentionally cause damage to an
organization. They work with an external actor, or alone, to sabotage the organization.
Insiders do not require many resources because their position grants them access to
critical systems. Separately, self-inflicted malfunction causes unintentional damage to an
organization, and occurs due to operator error or equipment failure.
Emergency responders found self-inflicted malfunction as the cause of several
SCADA emergencies, although attribution is notoriously difficult when an incident includes
cyber assets. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) attributed a gasoline
pipeline leak in Bellingham, Washington, to pipeline damage and degraded SCADA
software performance [1]. The leak and a subsequent explosion resulted in three deaths.
Investigators were unable to determine the cause of the software performance degradation,
but determined that it was likely due to an administrator’s configuration update on the live
system. The investigators also found several network security issues that could have led to
the pipeline leak, leaving open the possibility of an intentional attack.
2.1.7 Attacks
Vitek Boden attacked the Maroochy Shire Council sewage system in 2000 in the
first well-known ICS attack [2]. He stole equipment from Hunter Watertech, his former
employer and the company which installed the SCADA system, then used the equipment
to sabotage the system’s operation. The system lacked cyber defenses, and its security
relied on the obscurity of the system’s radio communication frequencies and protocols.
Vitek disabled sewage pumps and sensor alarms, and disrupted remote station
communications at several locations over a period of three months [2]. Initially, operators
attributed malfunction to installation error. A lack of cyber defense logs and tools, and
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Vitek’s actions to hide his attacks, led system operators to that incorrect conclusion. Vitek’s
success was due to his theft of equipment and a lack of cyber defense, and as such his attack
was of low complexity.
Attacker pr0f srs broke into the water infrastructure for South Houston, Texas, in 2011
[53]. He claimed that the SCADA system used a three letter password, and that knowledge
of the system’s software, and guessing the password, allowed him control over the system.
The attacker posted screenshots of the control system to Twitter and claimed that the attack
was partly in response to public DHS statements [65]. This attack was of low complexity,
and the attacker acted as a hacktivist in this instance.
Stuxnet is a computer worm that targets particular ICS hardware configurations and
sabotages their operation [11]. Specifically, Stuxnet targets Siemens’ SIMATIC PCS 7, an
industrial automation system in which the operator terminals execute Microsoft Windows.
It uses four exploits to propagate: a Windows shortcut vulnerability, shared network
folders, a Windows remote procedure call (RPC) vulnerability, and a Windows printer
sharing vulnerability [37]. Stuxnet uses several other Windows vulnerabilities to increase
its privileges.
Stuxnet modifies code on PLCs to vary the speed of motors [24]. The modified motor
speed sabotages the industrial process controlled by the motor. Some researchers count
Stuxnet among the most complex threats they have analyzed. It exploits at least four
previously-undisclosed bugs, and analysis shows that an organized team with delineated
responsibilities likely built its components [37]. Analysts believe that constructing the
Stuxnet worm required resources beyond the capabilities of all but a few attackers [24].
The complexity and consequences of Stuxnet suggest that the attacker belonged to threat
groups four or five: limited resource nation-states and terrorists, or unlimited resource
nation-states.
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2.2 Firmware
Firmware exists on the boundary of hardware and software. Firmware controls
the start-up sequence of modern personal computers (PCs), enabling low-level user
configuration and transfer to larger, more complex operating systems (OSs). Firmware
eases startup by permitting modern OSs access to a standard interface, abstracting out
many differences in PC hardware. Modern PCs store firmware in electrically erasable
programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) chips, and store the main OS on storage
external to the system motherboard.
In contrast, firmware often provides all system software functionality for embedded
devices. Due to space and durability requirements embedded devices often do not contain
storage external to the motherboard, and can therefore only execute an OS stored in
EEPROM or flash memory. Little reason exists, then, for firmware to transfer control to
any other entity, and manufacturers incorporate a full OS and all software in the firmware.
Generally, PC OSs and software provide simple update techniques, enabling users to
patch insecure software quickly once manufacturers release updates. Updates to firmware
require more user effort. Many systems require that the user reboot into maintenance
mode or manipulate hardware switches. Performance or safety-critical devices may require
disconnection from the rest of the system. Firmware’s critical function also makes testing
procedures more vital than for conventional software. These complications make firmware
security vulnerabilities more valuable to attackers.
Dacosta et al. reverse engineer the firmware of a Cisco 7960G IP phone [18]. They
first disassemble the binary firmware image, retrieving the assembly code for the phone’s
ARM processor. Then they manually perform control and data flow analysis to look for
potential software vulnerabilities. Firmware image disassembly requires several steps.
First, the researchers note that the firmware image consists of a compressed ZIP archive
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containing five named files. They deduce the contents of the files, then character strings
within the files identify the phone processor’s architecture.
Once they determine the code’s target architecture, the researchers possess much of
the information they require for code disassembly. Dacosta et al. manually analyze and
determine the contents of the file headers. They disassemble the appropriate code sections
and analyze addresses in switch statement jump tables to determine the code’s memory
mapping. The researchers identify C library functions that commonly lead to security
vulnerabilities, including strcpy, malloc, and sprintf, then begin manual code analysis
from those points.
Critically, Dacosta et al. note that they are not aware of tools that automate analysis
of ARM binaries. They use IDA Pro to perform the majority of their analysis. They use
their intuition to perform the initial analysis of the binary firmware image. They have
success relying on standard compression tools to unpack most of the image, and relying on
character strings to reveal the target architecture.
Delugré analyzes and modifies the firmware for a Broadcom Ethernet network
interface card (NIC) [19]. The Linux kernel contains the binary firmware image in an
undocumented format. Delugré determines that the firmware targets a MIPS processor
by locating the central processing unit (CPU) model on the physical device. He uses a
modified Linux kernel driver to retrieve the firmware from the NIC while in operation. The
process reveals the relevant memory addresses for code analysis and disassembly. After
retrieving the NIC firmware code, Delugré discusses how to compile and install firmware
with covert communications capabilities.
Miller disassembles the firmware of an Apple MacBook smart battery [43]. He
destructively disassembles the hardware to determine its components. The researcher
removes the Texas Instruments (TI) chips containing the firmware and uses TI software
to retrieve the firmware image. Miller manually analyzes the firmware contents and,
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although TI holds the firmware’s target architecture as proprietary information, the
researcher determines the target architecture from the format of several instructions. Miller
successfully modifies the battery firmware to report incorrect values for battery capacity
and charge.
Yasinsac et al. analyze the security of voting machine firmware [79]. They use
static code analysis and manual code review to find vulnerabilities in Florida voting
machines. The machines contain external storage (Compact Flash and a proprietary voting
ballot device) and on-board flash memory. An erasable programmable read-only memory
(EPROM) chip contains the voting machine firmware, but the manufacturer provides the
researchers with the firmware source code. The firmware contains all application code, and
was written entirely by the vendor, with the exception of the Compact Flash driver and C
standard library. Yasinsac’s review finds several buffer overflow vulnerabilities, and the
researchers theorize about potential problems with the general voting security process.
Fogie applies firmware reverse engineering techniques to Windows Compact Edition
(CE) embedded systems [25]. He discusses the basics of the ARM architecture, and
applies several common reverse engineering tools to real firmware. Hurman goes into
similar detail about Windows CE, but focuses on exploiting bugs and crafting shellcode
[29]. His analysis discusses embedded system software analysis using reverse engineering
techniques. Grand discusses general security concerns regarding firmware code, and
suggests that manufacturers incorporate code signing and encryption [28]. He notes that
they can immediately increase security by removing firmware images from public websites.
Grand also points out that manufacturers can use obfuscation to discourage the majority of
attackers.
2.3 Related Research
This research effort develops techniques to automate the firmware analysis process.
No known research considers firmware analysis as a rigorous process, but some research
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analyzes embedded system firmware, and the individual activities required for firmware
disassembly are active areas of research.
Peck and Peterson perform some related work in [48], where they disassemble the
firmwares for two PLC Ethernet modules. The authors separate program code from
the Rockwell 1756 ENBT and Koyo H4-ECOM100 Ethernet module firmwares, then
demonstrate a proof-of-concept modification of the Rockwell firmware. They place their
firmware modification within the firmware’s File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server code, and
program it to send an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping to a remote host
periodically. The authors update a target PLC over an Ethernet network, and find that the
PLC performs no authentication of the firmware code or of the personnel performing the
firmware update. Both devices update firmware over custom protocols, and current COTS
firewalls do not understand those protocols. In addition to the firmware modification, the
authors demonstrate cross-site scripting attacks on both Ethernet modules’ web servers.
The Rockwell device also provides FTP and Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) servers, and both servers have authentication vulnerabilities.
With their paper, Peck and Peterson demonstrate that malicious firmware modification
and installation, while not simple, is within the realm of the determined hacker. They
outline several situations where this form of attack benefits the attacker. The authors
conclude that system operators must be vigilant with PLC network security. Ultimately, the
proprietary nature of PLC firmware requires that vendors take action to improve security.
SCADA asset owners must hold vendors accountable by taking security into account when
purchasing equipment.
2.3.1 File Carving
Firmware images contain many component segments, including code and data
segments. Separating data from code is an initial step in firmware disassembly. File
carving is an active area of research in the digital forensics field that involves identifying
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and recovering files from hard disks, including partially destroyed disks. File carving
techniques are applicable to firmware image disassembly, and this section describes several
file carving research efforts.
Traditional file carvers search for file magic numbers, sequences of bytes that identify
the headers or footers of particular file types. The UNIX file command has existed since
at least 1973, and is the most well-known example of anything like a traditional file carver
[81]. The file command has a flexible configuration file which specifies magic numbers
for hundreds of file types. In general, it does not search for multiple sections and file types
within a file.
Foremost searches for magic numbers in both headers and footers, and carves the
appropriate section [46]. The United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations
developed the tool, and it is now an open-source project. Its configuration file allows users
to specify new file types by adding the header and footer magic numbers. Scalpel is a
traditional file carver Richard et al. designed for high performance [52]. Richard outlines
requirements for a high performance file carver, and implements those requirements by
improving Foremost.
Sites et al. describe a system for binary code translation between two architectures
[60]. The system locates the code within an executable, then translates it for a second
architecture. An executable’s header and symbol table describe the entry points for much of
the code, but can skip some. Sites’ system attempts to find other code by scanning through
sections skipped by the header and symbol table, including groups of valid instructions
which end in an unconditional branch or jump.
Underwood extends context-free grammars to describe the format of binary files, and
validates a binary file’s format via a context-free grammar parser [67]. The technique can
detect file format more accurately than simple magic number detection, but requires much
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more metadata describing each format. The technique is most useful for finding well-
formed files, or detecting which file parts are not well-formed.
McDaniel and Heydari first describe fingerprinting file types with byte frequency
analysis [40]. For each training file, their system generates an array of normalized
frequencies for each byte value. The system averages all files of a particular type, then
calculates a correlation strength similar to variance, to generate a fingerprint for that type.
The researchers create an algorithm to compute a test file’s similarity to each fingerprint,
then classify the test file’s type as that of the most similar fingerprint. Their test set contains
30 file types, and the classifier performs 30-class classification. When relying on file
headers and footers, their algorithm achieves a 96% accuracy. Otherwise, it achieves only
a 46% accuracy.
Erbacher and Mulholland distinguish file and data type to facilitate the identification of
compound file contents [23]. Compound files, like Microsoft Word Documents or firmware
images, can contain other files in addition to their own data and metadata. Thus while a
file’s overall file type may be Word Document it also contains other data types, like images
and spreadsheets, in their native file types. They apply 13 statistical file measures to a 7 file
type test corpus, and find that the measures which best differentiate the test files by type
are: average byte value, distribution of byte value averages, standard deviation, distribution
of standard deviations, and kurtosis.
Moody and Erbacher describe a system, SÁDI, which applies 6 statistical techniques
to data type identification [44]. Their techniques include distribution of byte values, and
Erbacher and Mulholland’s top five. They classify sections of test files using a sliding
window which varies by file type, but is generally 256 bytes. This enables them to identify
data types within a file. The system achieves 74% accuracy on 9-class classification.
In the Oscar file carver, Karresand and Shahmehri classify files with the normalized
Euclidean distance to a file type centroid [33]. Their file type centroids consist of the byte
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value frequency mean and standard deviation of a set of files belonging to that type. The
researchers built Oscar to assist with hard disk analysis, so it classifies disk image sections
with a disk-cluster sized sliding window of 4 kB, with a 4 kB step size. Karresand’s test set
concatenates 49 file types, and Oscar classifies each cluster as Joint Photographic Experts
Group (JPEG) or not-JPEG. Oscar achieved a 98% true positive rate, 0.01% false positive
rate, on the two-way classification problem.
Later, the researchers expand Oscar to consider a byte value rate-of-change frequency
metric [32]. Their system calculates the absolute value of the distance between all
consecutive bytes, then builds a histogram with those values. The rate-of-change values
fall within the range 0 to 255. The system extends the original Oscar centroids with the
rate-of-change means and standard deviations. Karresand and Shahmehri use the same
distance metric for both byte value frequency and rate-of-change frequency centroids. With
the extended system, the researchers boost classification accuracy on the JPEG two-way
classification problem to a 99% true positive rate, 0% false positive rate.
Veenman uses a byte value histogram, entropy, and Kolmogorov complexity with
a linear classifier to classify files [74]. His research considers both 2- and 11-class
classification problems, over 11 file types. The use case in Veenman’s research is digital
forensics, thus his file corpus included common desktop file types. Veenman achieved the
best accuracy, a 45% true positive rate, with 2-class classification.
Mayer applies long byte value n-grams, for 2 ≤ n ≤ 20, to file type classification [38].
His research considers 25 file types common to office environments, and models file types
with the long n-grams common to that type. To each test sample, the classifier assigns the
file type that maximizes the number of common n-grams present. Mayer achieves a 48%
accuracy on full files and a 22% accuracy on file segments. This large accuracy difference is
due to his exclusion of file headers from the segments, but the inclusion of header n-grams
in his file type models.
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Amirani et al. apply principal component analysis (PCA) to extract classification
features from the byte frequency distribution of test files [5]. They use the resulting
features to train a neural network to classify files of 6 types. The neural network allows
the researchers to achieve accurate classification, while PCA reduces the network size and
training time. They classify Microsoft Word, Windows Executable, Portable Document
Format (PDF), JPEG, HyperText Markup Language (HTML), and Graphics Interchange
Format (GIF) files. The system achieves an overall accuracy of 98% when classifying file
fragments that do not include headers or footers.
Calhoun and Coles perform 2-class file segment classification using Fisher’s linear
discriminant with 11 data statistics and 5 combinations of those statistics [12]. Their data
statistics include: entropy, mean byte value, byte value standard deviation, correlation,
longest common subsequence length, and byte value frequencies for bytes within a range.
While their research only quantifies results of 2-class classification, they state that their
technique applies to the more general n-value classification problem
Calhoun and Coles test their technique with two sets of GIF, JPEG and bitmap (BMP)
files. The first set includes bytes 128 through 1024 of each file, and the second set includes
bytes 512 through 1024. Including only part of each file enables them to test the accuracy
of their technique when files do not include metadata, and when forensic investigators have
only partially recovered a file. The statistic which performs best on the first test set is a
combination of byte frequency over three ranges, entropy, byte frequency mode, and byte
frequency standard deviation. This combination achieves 88.3% accuracy on the first set
and 84.2% accuracy on the second. Longest common subsequence yields the best accuracy
on the second set, at 86%, and 84.5% accuracy on the first set.
Axelsson uses NCD and k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) to perform n-value file segment
classification [7]. NCD is an approximation of normalized information distance, which
is a measure of data entropy. Axelsson defines NCD with Equation 2.1, where C(x) is
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the compressed length of x, and C(x, y) the compressed length of x and y concatenated.
He chooses gzip as the compression algorithm, and investigates settings of k from 1 to
10. The algorithm calculates NCD for 512 B test and training fragments, then assigns test
segments the most common file type among the k lowest NCD values.
NCD(x, y) =
C(x, y) −min(C(x),C(y))
max(C(x),C(y))
(2.1)
Axelsson’s file corpus contains 17 file types including executable files, images,
movies, and common document formats. He reports approximately 50% accuracy overall
for the 17-value classification problem, but approximately 90% accuracy for several file
types. Furthermore he finds that, among the tested values, no k value performed better than
the others. Axelsson suggests that future work should consider classifying fragments into
more generic file type classes.
Conti et al. classify 14,000 1 kB file fragments from 14 common file types using k-NN
[15]. Their k-NN algorithm evaluates the distance between fragments with Euclidean and
Manhattan distance over 4 file statistics: Shannon entropy using byte bigrams, byte value
arithmetic mean, Chi Square Goodness of Fit of byte distribution to a random distribution,
and Hamming weight. They define Hamming weight as the proportion of one bits in a
segment. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 give the Shannon entropy and Chi Square equations,
respectively. In Equation 2.2, p(Xi) represents the probability that byte value i occurs
within a file fragment. In Equation 2.3, oi represents the frequency of byte i within a
file fragment, and ei represents the expected frequency of byte i within a uniform random
distribution. Conti et al. calculate Chi Square Goodness of Fit using the χ2 value and a Chi
Square distribution with 255 degrees of freedom. They determine that, for their test cases,
Euclidean distance classifies file fragments more accurately than Manhattan distance.
22
H(x) = −
255∑
i=0
p(Xi)log10(p(Xi)) (2.2)
χ2 =
255∑
i=0
(oi − ei)2/ei (2.3)
They extract file fragments from the approximate middle of sample files to avoid file
headers and footers. Their 14 file types consist of compressed data in several formats,
encrypted data, random data, base64 or uuencoded data, Linux ELF and Windows PE
executable data, bitmap data, and mixed text data. During classification, Conti et al.
test values of k from 1 to 25, and settle on k = 3 because larger values provide no
significant return. The classifier was unable to distinguish several file types during 14-value
classification, so Conti et al. clustered each file type by similarity, making the problem 6-
value classification. They clustered the random, encrypted and compressed data together,
clustered the executable formats, and placed the other file types in individual clusters. Their
classifier achieved 82.5% accuracy for bitmaps, and better than 96% accuracy for the 5
other clusters.
Li et al. describe the performance of a system they call Fileprints [36]. The
system models file types with the mean and standard deviation of byte value frequency.
Li et al. design Fileprints to handle byte value n-grams, but determine that 1-grams
are sufficiently complex to accurately classify files. Additionally, a 1-gram file footprint
(a fileprint) contains only 256 elements, whereas a 2-gram fileprint requires 256 times
the storage space. Li et al. find the 1-gram fileprint performance sufficient, especially
considering the low storage requirement advantages.
The Fileprints test corpus consists of five general file types: EXE (including DLL
files), GIF, JPEG, DOC (including Word, Powerpoint and Excel files), and PDF. Li et al.
consider three model types. Their single-centroid model combines each file type’s training
examples into one fileprint per type. A multi-centroid model consists of multiple models
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for each file type. K-means clustering builds K fileprints per type. The third model type
uses individual training examples as fileprints. Therefore, if n training samples belong to
file type t, Fileprints assigns n models to file type t.
With both the single and multi-centroid models Fileprints finds average byte value
frequencies over all training examples, then calculates the Mahalanobis distance to training
samples to determine the closest training model. Li et al. give Mahalanobis distance as
Equation 2.4, where i is byte value. Values xi and σi are the mean frequency and standard
deviation, respectively, for i in the training examples. Then, yi represents i’s frequency in
the test sample. Li et al. use α as a smoothing factor, which becomes necessary when
the standard deviation is 0. Fileprints classifies a test sample as the type of the closest
training example. No standard deviation values exist for Fileprints’ third model type,
so Li et al. cannot use Mahalanobis distance, and use Manhattan distance instead.
D(x, y) =
n−1∑
i=0
|xi − yi|
σi + α
(2.4)
Fileprints’ accuracy on the five-way classification problem with the single-centroid
model is 82%. With the multi-centroid model and individual-example models they find
89.5% and 93.8% accuracy, respectively. Li et al. find better performance when they
truncate files. Truncation causes file header magic numbers to occupy a greater percentage
of the total file. Li et al. truncate test and training files to include only the first 20 bytes, then
apply Fileprints using the single-centroid model. This test achieves 98.9% accuracy.
Zhang and White apply a system similar to Fileprints to network traffic. They use
their system to detect executables in network traffic [80]. Their extension to Fileprints
examines traffic that represents only a portion of an executable. The researchers’ goal is
to use their system as an anomaly detection system sensor, and thus detect anomalous or
hidden executables in network traffic.
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2.3.2 Code Classification
Kolter and Maloof construct a system which classifies Windows executables as
malicious or benign using a variety of machine learning techniques [35]. They experiment
with boosted and un-boosted decision trees, SVMs, instance-based learners, and naive
Bayes classifiers to determine the most effective technique for the classification problem.
Kolter and Maloof perform pilot studies to determine the number of attributes, n-gram size,
and number of bytes-per-gram that produce the most accurate results. They settle on 500
byte value 4-grams, and use these parameters for the remainder of their tests.
The researchers use information gain (IG) to determine which 4-grams best-
characterize their corpus. IG provides a measure of the relevance of each 4-gram to the
classification problem. IG yields larger values for features which appear more frequently
in one class than another. Equation 2.5 gives a version of IG equivalent to Kolter and
Maloof’s. In it, g is a particular attribute (a 4-gram in this case) and Ci is the ith class
(malicious or benign). P(g) is the proportion of training samples containing attribute g,
P(Ci) is the proportion of training samples in class i, and P(g,Ci) is the proportion of
training samples of class i that exhibit attribute g (that contain the 4-gram g represents).
Equation 2.5 then uses the presence or absence of a 4-gram to determine how well it
contributes to the classification problem, and is also known as average mutual information
[78].
IG(g) =
∑
Ci
[
P(g,Ci)log
(
P(g,Ci)
P(g)P(Ci)
)
+ (1 − P(g,Ci))log
(
1 − P(g,Ci)
(1 − P(g))P(Ci)
)]
(2.5)
Kolter and Maloof use machine learning techniques implemented in Weka [77].
Specifically, they use the J48, sequential minimal optimization, and AdaBoost.M1
algorithms for decision trees, SVMs and boosting, respectively. The J48 algorithm builds
a binary tree with one 4-gram at each node, and branches representing presence or absence
of that gram. J48 uses gain ratio, a measure similar to IG, to place each gram, then
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prunes unhelpful branches to avoid overtraining [51]. Platt originally describes sequential
minimal optimization, a tool which makes training SVMs efficient [49]. The Weka
SVMs implementation solves multi-class problems through pairwise classification [77].
The AdaBoost algorithm boosts existing Weka classifiers by generating multiple classifier
models, then weighting them based on performance.
Kolter and Maloof apply their classification system to a corpus of 1,971 benign and
1,651 malicious Windows executables. They find that the boosted decision tree and SVM
classifiers perform best, with true positive rates exceeding 0.95 for false positive rates less
than 0.05.
2.4 Statistical Measures
Typical definitions of statistical measures such as true positive rate, false positive rate,
true negative rate and false negative rate work well for two-way classifiers. Equations 2.6,
2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 depict these measures, with values corresponding to the two-way classifier
confusion matrix in Table 2.1. General n-way classifiers require more general statistical
measures, and Equations 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 give these measures [61]. Values
correspond to the n-way classifier confusion matrix in Table 2.2.
Table 2.1: Confusion matrix for a two-way classifier
Prediction
negative positive
A
ct
ua
l
negative samplesn,n samplesn,p
positive samplesp,n samplesp,p
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true positive rate =
samplesp,p
samplesp,p + samplesp,n
(2.6)
false negative rate =
samplesp,n
samplesp,p + samplesp,n
(2.7)
true negative rate =
samplesn,n
samplesn,p + samplesn,n
(2.8)
false positive rate =
samplesn,p
samplesn,p + samplesn,n
(2.9)
The true positive and true negative rate equations correspond with producer accuracy
in the case of a 2-way classifier. Likewise, the false positive and false negative rate
equations correspond with omission error. Producer accuracy is the percent of samples
of classi that the classifier identifies correctly as belonging to classi. It is the likelihood
that the classifier will identify an item correctly, given that it belongs to a specific class.
Consumer accuracy is the percent of samples the classifier identifies as classi that actually
belong to classi. It is the likelihood that a particular class’s output correctly identifies a
particular class.
Table 2.2: Confusion matrix for an n-way classifier
Prediction
class1 class2 ... classn
A
ct
ua
l
class1 samples1,1 samples1,2 ... samples1,n
class2 samples2,1 samples2,2 ... samples2,n
... ... ... ... ...
classn samplesn,1 samplesn,2 ... samplesn,n
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class i producer accuracy: PAi =
samplesi,i∑n
m=1 samplesi,m
(2.10)
class i omission error: PEi =
∑n
m=1 samplesi,m − samplesi,i∑n
m=1 samplesi,m
= 1 − PAi (2.11)
class i consumer accuracy: CAi =
samplesi,i∑n
m=1 samplesm,i
(2.12)
class i commission error: CEi =
∑n
m=1 samplesm,i − samplesi,i∑n
m=1 samplesm,i
= 1 −CAi (2.13)
Equation 2.14 provides a rough measure of overall classifier accuracy. It yields the
total percent of correctly identified samples.
overall accuracy =
∑n
m=1 samplesm,m∑
samples
(2.14)
This chapter provided an overview of SCADA technology, describing system
components, current threats, and attacks. It discussed firmware’s function on PLCs,
and the potential for firmware-based attacks. This chapter provided an overview of
research related to this thesis, including work on firmware reversing, file carving, and
malware identification. Chapter 3 describes the file carving and malware identification
algorithms this research applies to firmware disassembly. It discusses this research’s
purpose and experimental methodology. Chapter 3 describes how this research assesses
those algorithms, how it eases firmware disassembly, and how the research validates its
results.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
This research determines the effectiveness of a set of techniques which characterize,
disassemble, and analyze firmware. It seeks to automate firmware analysis whether the
vendor provides that firmware, an analyst forensically retrieves it from the contents of an
EEPROM, or a security professional intercepts it after malicious third party modification.
Therefore, the techniques this research develops must consider firmware in a generic sense.
The ideal technique set makes no assumptions about vendor firmware layout decisions or
header and footer contents. These parameters vary between vendors, devices, and firmware
acquisition method.
The analysis process begins by separating a firmware into likely component segments
and identifying the file types of those segments, then identifying the target architecture of
code segments. Therefore, this research focuses on techniques capable of completing these
two tasks. It evaluates three techniques which identify firmware file segments by file type,
and two techniques that identify code segment target architectures. This research seeks to
identify algorithms which provide the most accurate firmware segment decomposition and
code architecture classification.
3.2 Approach
Figure 3.1 depicts the system under test, the Firmware Disassembly System. To
disassemble firmware, a software system must uncompress compressed segments. It must
identify component segment boundaries, then identify those segments’ file type. The file
type classifier identifies some segments with the code file type, and the software system
must then classify those segments’ architecture and endianness. Finally it must disassemble
the binary code segments, resulting in correct assembly-language code output.
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the Firmware Disassembly System
This research applies file carving algorithms to the file type identification problem, and
applies malware identification algorithms to the code architecture identification problem.
It evaluates each algorithm’s accuracy when applied to firmware binaries or code segments
respectively.
Each file carving algorithm classifies the file type of a segment of the binary image.
The file carving algorithms do not segment the file themselves, and require a separate
segmentation algorithm. This research considers two segmentation algorithms. Conti et
al. solve the problem of segmenting binary files with a sliding window [15]. The sliding
window is 1024 bytes wide with a step size of 512 bytes, and matches properties of their
statistical classifier. This research considers file segmentation with a generalized version
of the sliding window. The second file segmentation technique calculates an entropy value
for each byte in a firmware based on a sliding window. It uses a segmented-least-squares
algorithm to minimize the number of firmware sections, and to minimize the squared error
of each section’s mean entropy [34].
This research’s first file type identification technique is Axelsson’s [7]. He
characterizes files with NCD, then associates them with file types from the training set
using k-nearest neighbor. In the second technique, Li et al. perform n-gram analysis on
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their training set to characterize file types, then use Mahalanobis distance to associate files
with file types [36]. The third file carving technique characterizes file segments with four
statistical signatures [15]. Conti et al. use k-nearest neighbor to associate members of their
test set with file types. All three file carving algorithms perform classification for two or
more classes.
Kolter and Maloof apply data mining techniques to malware detection and classifi-
cation [35]. They collect 4-grams from executables, rank them by information gain, then
select the top 500 as classifier attributes. They classify the resulting 4-gram set with seven
algorithms. Their best results come from the boosted decision tree and SVM algorithms.
This research uses the decision tree and SVM algorithms, with Kolter and Maloof’s at-
tribute selection technique, for code architecture identification.
Each algorithm requires a training set and a test set. The test and training sets
for the file carving algorithms consist of firmware images and sets of files common to
firmwares respectively. Training and test sets for the code classification algorithms consist
of code segments common to firmwares, as Section 3.4 describes. Metadata describes the
characteristics of each member in the test and training sets. The file carving algorithms
and the code classification algorithms use supervised training, so training samples require
metadata describing their file type, or code architecture and endianness. Testing the
pipeline as a whole requires firmwares or pseudo-firmwares, and metadata describing their
contents.
This research begins by training all classification algorithms with the appropriate
training set and metadata. Next, classification techniques analyze their test sets without
metadata. This research evaluates the performance of each algorithm by comparing its
output to the test set metadata. This thesis reports and compares the accuracy of each
classification technique.
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3.3 System Boundaries
Figure 3.2 depicts the system under test as a set of inputs, outputs and components.
Each component corresponds with a Figure 3.1 block. This research tests the components
labeled CUT (Component Under Test).
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Figure 3.2: Firmware Disassembly System boundaries, inputs, and outputs
The Uncompressor and Disassembler components use standard compression and
disassembly techniques. This research assumes that firmware uses standard compression
techniques like Gzip [20], ZLib [21], and Lempel-Ziv-Markov chain algorithm (LZMA)
[47]. The assumption greatly simplifies uncompression, and in practice vendors generally
use standard compression techniques. The assumption rules out proper analysis of
firmwares compressed with non-standard techniques, but the system’s modularity allows
future implementation of alternative compressions. The disassembler also uses existing
disassembly algorithms, specifically, those implemented in the GNU Binutils project
[26]. These system components already have proven performance, and the goal of this
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research is to accurately provide those components with appropriate input, not to evaluate
the accuracy of those components.
3.4 Workload
Binary firmware images are the Firmware Disassembly System’s workload. Ideally,
real firmwares would form the system’s test set. To evaluate the system’s results, however,
the test set must include metadata that describes the firmware contents. Few PLC firmwares
exist which meet that requirement. Therefore, the system must test pseudo-firmwares with
known contents. Workload parameters characterize the pseudo-firmwares.
Real firmware images vary widely in composition. Simple PLCs may only require
a firmware with one code segment. More complex PLCs with Ethernet interfaces may
provide Web and FTP servers, and require larger firmwares that include file systems and
multiple code segments. Many PLCs are modular, and contain several processors with
potentially different architectures [58].
This research models firmware as a concatenation of multiple files of different types.
With this model, three parameters characterize a pseudo-firmware. File segment type and
bounds identify the file type of a set of bytes within a firmware image, and code architecture
identifies the architecture of segments with the code file type. Analysis shows that real
firmwares frequently include byte-padding for some segments, but this research does not
pad pseudo-firmware segments. In practice, a simple padding-detection heuristic would
increase system performance.
Analysis reveals that firmwares frequently include compiled code, compressed
sections, images, HTML files, and even documentation. This research sources firmware
file sections from the DigitalCorpora project [27]. This research uses only a fraction of
the full one million file corpus, as Table 3.1 describes. The Markup file type includes
HTML and Extensible Markup Language (XML) files. Text includes ASCII and UTF-8
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encoded log files, character-delineated files (for instance, comma-separated value files),
and documents represented in plain-text format.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of the test and training set file corpus
File type Test Corpus
File Count
Total Data (MB) Average File Size (kB)
GZip 441 244.9 568.7
JPEG 3489 458.7 134.6
PDF 1758 1076.2 626.9
Microsoft Word 2654 1023.4 394.9
Markup 12549 808.8 66.0
Text 3770 1023.4 278.0
PostScript 684 1154.9 1729.0
GIF 1477 108.9 75.5
ARM 8926 1057.7 121.3
Motorola 68000 13038 1143.3 89.8
AVR 13499 1029.9 78.1
PowerPC 9941 1264.4 130.2
This research sources the code file types, ARM, Motorola 68000, AVR and PowerPC,
from Debian Linux repositories serving those architectures. Debian repositories contain
.deb files, a compressed archive format. GNU tools extract raw code sections from the
.deb files to build this research’s code file types. The Debian repositories contain little-
endian ARM binaries, and big-endian AVR, Motorola and PowerPC binaries.
In constructing each pseudo-firmware, this research concatenates one random-sized
segment from a random position in one file of each type. Each segment’s maximum size
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is a function of source file size. Specifically, the system avoids selecting bytes from the
beginning and ending of source files to avoid file headers and footers. The system enforces
a 1 kB minimum segment size when files are at least 1 kB, and includes the entire source
file when files are smaller than 1 kB.
3.5 Performance Metrics
File Type Classifier Metrics measure the accuracy of the File Type Classifier
component. Producer and consumer accuracy, and correspondingly omission and
commission error, define file type classifier accuracy. Section 2.4 defines these statistics.
These implicitly tie the performance of the file segmenter with that of the file type classifier.
Producer and consumer accuracy quickly depict how accurately a multi-class classifier
assigns classes, and how useful those assignments are to an analyst. Confusion matrices
presenting these results enable detailed analysis of which classes are more difficult to
classify correctly.
The component defines the file type of a binary file segment, thereby identifying
the file type of a range of bytes. This research uses confusion matrices to describe the
proportion of bytes assigned type X out of all bytes actually of type Y . The producer
accuracy for a particular file type is the percentage of bytes in the input binary to which
the component assigns the correct file type. The system considers bytes to which the
component assigns no file type, or multiple types, incorrect. As a consequence of this
definition, this metric penalizes segment classifications with incorrect bounds when the
incorrect bounds hinder firmware analysis.
Similarly, this research uses confusion matrices to describe the proportion of bytes
actually type Y out of all bytes assigned type X. The consumer accuracy for a particular
type is the percentage of bytes assigned to a type X that are actually of type X. Again,
the system considers bytes to which the component assigns no file type, or multiple types,
incorrect.
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The Code Architecture Metrics depicted in Figure 3.2 measure the accuracy of the
Code Architecture Classifier. Code architecture metrics include the same metrics as the
File Type Classifier Metrics. The metrics serve the same purpose, but apply to code
architectures instead of file types. In practice, the Code Architecture Classifier relies on
output of the File Type Classifier. This research evaluates the Code Architecture Classifier
independently of the File Type Classifier, simulating ideal output of the File Type Classifier.
For this reason, the Code Architecture Classifier must assign one and only one architecture
to each input byte.
In addition to using producer and consumer accuracies to evaluate system component
performance, this research uses them to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole.
Confusion matrices again enable analysis of the system’s misclassifications in detail.
3.6 Experimental Design
This research characterizes the File Type Classifiers and Code Architecture Classifiers
independently, to determine their performance without the influence of potential classifier
interactions. Within the system the File Type Classifier does not rely on the Code
Architecture Classifier, but the Code Architecture Classifier relies on correct output from
the File Type Classifier. This dependency may affect overall system performance.
Therefore, this thesis also characterizes the full system’s performance. It simulates the
Firmware Disassembly System’s response to real-world stimulus by measuring its response
to a synthetic workload. This research provides 95% confidence intervals for the synthetic
workload accuracy data. Determining the accuracy of the components under test requires
knowledge of the ideal component response, but extracting the characteristics of real PLC
firmwares is difficult. Additionally, while manufacturer websites contain repositories of
PLC firmware images, this research requires an order of magnitude more input files than
images available. These issues preclude system classification using real-world firmwares.
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This research uses the synthetic workload described in Section 3.4, and thus simulates the
system’s responses to real-world stimuli, to overcome the former problems.
After simulation, this research demonstrates result validity through measurement of
the Firmware Disassembly System’s performance on a small validation set of real-world
PLC firmwares. Validation also shows that, although the file types included in the test and
training corpus are from firmware in general and are not specific to PLC firmwares, the
results apply to PLC firmwares. Validation requires a smaller set of firmware images than
system evaluation. Validation still requires knowledge of the ideal component responses,
but the small set of firmwares required for validation makes manual analysis feasible.
3.7 System Implementation
The Firmware Disassembly System consists of Python 3 and C++ code. A graphical
user interface (GUI), built with the cross-platform Tk framework, provides access to much
of the system functionality. The Firmware Disassembly System executes on Windows and
Unix-like operating systems, and requires no hardware more complex than a consumer-
grade laptop.
The system relies on the Weka [77] machine learning tool, and uses its command line
interface. Weka implements both of this research’s code classification algorithms. With
Weka’s decision tree algorithm, J48, this research sets the confidence factor parameter to
0.25, sets the minimum number of instances per leaf to 2, and enables pruning. With
the SVM algorithm, this research sets complexity factor to 1, and allows training data
normalization. These are Weka’s default parameter values.
The system also relies on the python-statlib [4] and bitarray [57] projects for
implementations of simple statistics functions and efficient bit arrays. The system uses
Python’s Mersenne Twister pseudo-random number generator to generate all random values
[50]. While the Mersenne Twister is not cryptographically secure, its long period makes it
suitable for this project. The system uses GNU’s Binutils to disassemble code sections.
37
Matasano Security’s deezee tool, described by Peck and Peterson [48], motivates the
Firmware Disassembly System’s uncompression implementation.
3.8 Methodology Summary
This research characterizes algorithms from file carving and malware identification,
as applied to PLC firmware reverse engineering. Figure 3.1 depicts the steps required
for firmware reverse engineering, and consequently the blocks that form the Firmware
Disassembly System. The system locates compressed sections within the firmware and
uncompresses them, segments the firmware image into multiple byte ranges, then assigns a
file type to each segment. The system then identifies the target architecture of all segments
that contain processor instructions. Finally, it disassembles those code segments.
This research evaluates the Firmware Disassembly System via simulation. It evaluates
the Code Architecture Classifier and File Type Classifier components independently, then
evaluates the system as a whole.
System evaluation uses simulation to provide the large number of well-classified input
files that statistical standards require. The simulation generates a synthetic workload
composed of firmware images which match some characteristics of real-world PLC
firmwares. Finally, this research characterizes real-world PLC firmwares to validate the
experimental results.
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4 Results and Analysis
This chapter presents and discusses this research effort’s results. It considers the
system in stages, first discussing the performance of file segmenting algorithms, followed
by the performance of the file and code type classifiers. The chapter then analyzes the
entire machine learning pipeline’s accuracy on the test set.
Finally, the chapter discusses disassembly of real-world firmwares. It presents some
side results important for the general firmware disassembly problem, then describes the
disassembly of several firmwares. Finally, the chapter considers the research system’s
performance on real-world firmware.
4.1 File Segmenting Algorithms
This research considers two general file segmenting algorithms, and this section
analyzes the performance of four variations on those algorithms. The first general algorithm
is a generic sliding window with configurable window and step size. This section uses the
term Sliding Window to refer to this most generic case. The Even Divisions algorithm refers
to a sliding window with window size such that it breaks a file into a configurable number
of segments. Even Divisions uses a step size equal to the window size.
The second general algorithm chooses segments based upon regions of constant
entropy. Specifically, the Segmented-Least-Squares algorithm uses segmented-least-
squares to choose segments in order to minimize both mean-squared-error and segment
count. Unfortunately, the segmented-least-squares dynamic programming algorithm is of
O(n3) complexity. To achieve analysis run times less than a day on firmwares greater
than 500 kB, this section’s Segmented-Least-Squares algorithm uses the Douglas-Peucker
algorithm as an initial filter on the entropy values [22]. The Douglas-Peucker algorithm
reduces a set of points while maintaining some of the original shape. This section also
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considers the performance of the Douglas-Peucker algorithm alone at reducing entropy
values to a set of sections.
The file segmenter test set consists of a set of pseudo-firmwares containing a total
of 120 segments, and comprising 8 MB. Figure 4.1 provides a performance overview of
the file segmenting algorithms. The segment and code type classifiers require time to run,
and the time to classify all segments increases approximately linearly with the number
of segments. Therefore an appropriate file segmenting algorithm must accurately find
file segments without introducing too many segments. Thus, Figure 4.1 compares file
segmenter root mean square error (RMSE), and the ratio of segments yielded to actual.
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Figure 4.1: File segmenter performance
Both general sliding window algorithms perform similarly, and produce the best
tradeoff between segment ratio and error. In no case did the entropy algorithms produce an
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error better than the general sliding window algorithms at a similar segment ratio. Table 4.1
shows the relationship between algorithm parameters and error for both sliding window
algorithms. The performance of Sliding Window depends only upon step size and not upon
window size, due to the definition of error in this test. Thus, the table does not contain
window size. In practice the window size must be at least as large as the step size, or the
sliding window will skip bytes between windows.
Table 4.1 only displays configurations which yield between 100 and 12,000 segments
for the 120 segment input, as indicated by found-to-actual segment ratios between 0.833
and 100. Configurations with found-to-actual ratios less than 1 cannot provide enough
information for the file type classifier to identify all component files, and must provide an
analyst with incomplete results. Found-to-actual ratios greater than 100 cause firmware
analysis times to exceed 20 minutes, and are therefore unreasonable in practice.
Table 4.2 compares the performance of Douglas-Peucker and Segmented-Least-
Squares. It contains results of the tests with the best RMSE for each value of Num.
Segments. Segmented-Least-Squares only has Num. Segments values up to 213 due to
run time limitations. The algorithm’s O(n3) nature causes larger values of the parameter to
require firmware analysis times exceeding one hour.
The Num. Segments parameter specifies an approximate number of points for
the Douglas-Peucker algorithm to output, whether it’s acting as a filter for Segmented-
Least-Squares or on its own. For Douglas-Peucker an increase in this parameter value
corresponds with an increase in the the number of segments it yields. In general, this
statement holds for Segmented-Least-Squares too, because an increase in the parameter
gives the algorithm more points to consider, and therefore more potential segments. In
the case of Num. Segments values 28 and 211, however, this statement does not hold. An
interaction with the Window Size parameter causes Segmented-Least-Squares to yield more
segments than with larger Num. Segments parameter values.
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Table 4.1: Performance vs. parameter value for the sliding window algorithms
Algorithm Parameter Value RMSE Segments
Found/Actual
1024 288 66.8
2048 616 33.4
3072 824 22.3
4096 1171 16.7
Sliding Window Step Size 6144 1725 11.2
8192 2263 8.39
12288 3369 5.60
16384 4489 4.22
24576 6777 2.83
32768 9742 2.13
1000 234 83.3
600 411 50.0
300 802 25.0
200 1288 16.7
Even Divisions Num. Segments 100 2462 8.33
60 4001 5.00
30 8667 2.50
20 13732 1.67
10 30759 0.833
Both general sliding window algorithms execute quickly. They perform segmentation
in under one second for all cases in Table 4.1. Indeed, they only need to determine the
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Table 4.2: Performance vs. parameter value for the entropy algorithms
Algorithm Num. Segments Window Size RMSE Segments
Found/Actual
25 2048 100909 2.67
26 2048 47767 5.31
27 2048 19506 10.5
28 2048 16374 20.9
29 2048 6936 41.6
Douglas-Peucker 210 2048 5045 82.0
211 2048 4214 159
212 2048 701 298
213 2048 437 541
214 2048 332 937
215 2048 198 1548
28 1024 21535 3.13
29 2048 23435 2.77
Segmented-Least- 210 2048 23576 3.05
Squares 211 512 11631 6.80
212 2048 10524 5.28
213 512 10110 10.6
size of the test firmware to perform segmentation, which is a speedy task on modern
operating systems. In contrast, Douglas-Peucker requires approximately 900 seconds to
complete segmentation for the test set. Segmented-Least-Squares requires approximately
8000 seconds in the lowest error test cases, or 3000 in next-lowest error cases.
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This research selects Even Divisions as the best file segmenting algorithm of those it
tests, and uses this algorithm for the remainder of the research. The general sliding window
algorithms make the best error/segment ratio tradeoff, and run fastest. Additionally, the
Even Divisions parameter is linearly proportional to run time, and provides users with a
simple tradeoff between accuracy and computation time. Large values of the parameter (or
small input firmwares) may result in segments inappropriately small for the file type and
code classifiers, so this research enforces a minimum segment size of 512 B. This research
also uses 100 for the Num. Segments parameter, because it provides a reasonable balance
between run-time and accuracy for the available firmwares.
4.2 Classifier Analysis
Each classifier builds models to describe the training set. During testing they compare
test samples to the models to determine which model best-matches the sample. The internal
representation of the model differs by classifier, but each model must represent properties
inherent to the files it represents. The support vector machine (SVM) classifier model
is a set of weights for a neural network, and the model itself yields little insight into
the classifier performance. This section discusses the properties revealed by the classifier
models, but skips discussion of the SVM classifier. This section builds classifier models
from the training corpus. Table 4.3 describes the training corpus, which is 80% of the full
corpus as described by Table 3.1.
4.2.1 Fileprints
Fileprints represents file types as a byte-value mean frequency and variance. This
section graphs and discusses the fileprints of several file types, as generated from the
training set comprising 80% of the file corpus. Each graph represents byte values on the
X-axis and presents the mean proportion of each byte in the training files and that value’s
variance. Each graph depicts variance on a logarithmic-scale Y-axis.
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Table 4.3: Training set characteristics
File type File Count File type File Count
GZip 352 PostScript 547
JPEG 2791 GIF 1181
PDF 1406 ARM 7140
Microsoft Word 2123 Motorola 68000 10430
Markup 10039 AVR 10799
Text 3016 PowerPC 7952
Figure 4.2 provides a reference, and is the fileprint of a set of 100 files containing
100 kB of uniformly-distributed random byte values. The expected average byte frequency
for this distribution is 1/256 = 0.39%, and Figure 4.2 shows that this expectation holds in
practice. Additionally, the random distribution has a small, flat variance profile.
GZip and Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG)’s fileprints are not visually
similar. Figure 4.3 shows GZip’s byte value peaks have a periodic nature, with major peaks
at bytes 127, 63, 191, and 255, and smaller peaks on every eighth byte. However, these
byte frequency peaks correspond with peaks on a variance plot that is already, generally, ten
times that of the random distribution. JPEG has no noticeable periodic nature, as Figure 4.4
depicts. It has only one major peak (besides the maximum and minimum byte values), at
byte 32. The JPEG fileprint also shows relatively large variance. Similarly, the fileprints
for Microsoft Word files and Portable Document Formats (PDFs) show relatively large
variance. Section 4.3.1 discusses the implications of this fact.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that the Text and PostScript fileprints are visually similar.
Both possess similar variance distributions. However, the smallest variance values in the
Text fileprint indicate that some byte values were not present in any text files, and the
PostScript fileprint shows no such case. The largest byte frequency peak in both is at byte
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Figure 4.2: Fileprint of random files
32, the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) representation of a
space. Both fileprints show that bytes 44 through 57 and 97 through 117 occur frequently,
and these correspond to the ASCII representations of punctuation, the numbers, and most
of the lowercase alphabet.
Figure 4.7 show that Graphics Interchange Format (GIF) file byte frequency has a
periodic nature. Bytes divisible by four present more frequently, a result similar to that
of GZip files in Figure 4.3. This is because GIF images use Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW)
compression, an algorithm similar to GZip compression [14]. Figure 4.8 depicts the code
training files fileprint, pooling all code architectures. The code fileprint peaks correspond
with bytes present in the decision tree classifiers’ most frequently used leaves. Notably,
bytes 0x40, 0x4E, and 0x80 correspond to the peaks at 64, 78, and 128 respectively, and
Section 4.2.4 indicates that these bytes appear frequently in decision tree leaves.
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Figure 4.3: Fileprint of GZip training files
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Figure 4.4: Fileprint of JPEG training files
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Figure 4.5: Fileprint of Text training files
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Figure 4.6: Fileprint of PostScript training files
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Figure 4.7: Fileprint of GIF training files
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Figure 4.8: Fileprint of code training files
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4.2.2 Statistical
Figure 4.9 displays the normalized model parameters of Conti’s statistics-based
classifier, as applied to this research’s training data. Ideally, all file types have values
distinct enough to enable the classifier to distinguish between each with Euclidean distance.
Visually however, the GZip, JPEG, PDF, and GIF file types form one cluster, while the
Microsoft Word, Markup, Text, and PostScript file types form a second. This suggests that
the statistical classifier will have difficulty distinguishing between these clustered types.
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Figure 4.9: Statistical classifier model
Data comprising the Random file type come from a uniform distribution over all byte
values. Figure 4.9 provides the Random file type for comparison only, and shows the effect
of parameter normalization. The uniform distribution suggests that the average byte value
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should approximate 0x80, and it does in practice. Additionally, random values should, and
do, have the highest entropy and chi-square values.
The Microsoft Word, Markup, Text, PostScript and Code file types have lower mean
byte values and entropies than the other types. Word’s hamming weight value differs
significantly from all other file types, suggesting that the classifier will have success
distinguishing its type. Unfortunately, the variance of the Word values is 10 times that
of the other file types. This indicates that these values vary more significantly between
training samples. The classifier may still have difficulty separating Word files from the rest
because it uses k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) with training samples. The Code file type has
a greater byte mean value than the other clustered types, suggesting that the classifier has a
method for distinguishing Code segments.
GZip, JPEG, PDF and GIF have similar values for all parameters. Their entropy
values compare to the Random file type, and show that these file types contain more
information than the others. The similarity of these types’ parameters suggest that the
classifier will confuse these types easily.
All chi-square values in Figure 4.9, except Random, are 0.02 or smaller. A non-zero
chi-square value indicates that the byte values are distributed nearly randomly. The figure’s
values indicate that all file types in the training set are significantly different from random.
This result suggests that the chi-square measure provides little information upon which the
classifier might base a decision.
4.2.3 Normalized Compression Distance
This research trains the normalized compression distance (NCD) classifier on 10% of
the training corpus due to the time constraints discussed later in Section 4.3.3. Axelsson’s
NCD classifier has little model to discuss, because it calculates little in advance. The
classifier calculates the compression length of training samples in advance, and Table 4.4
presents a summary of those values. The smallest and largest training sample compression
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distances are 29 B and 1047 B respectively, and they belong to a code sample and a
PostScript sample respectively.
Many values in the Table 4.4 are similar, for instance, the mean compression length
of Microsoft Word and Text samples. This is not cause for concern because NCD
bases classification on a comparison of compression length of test and training samples
individually, to compression length of concatenated test and training samples. Equation 2.1
describes the comparison.
The classifier uses GZip compression, and selects multiple 1 kB disjoint sections
from training samples. When training samples are smaller than 1 kB, the classifier selects
only one section comprising the entire sample. Table 4.4 indicates that the compression
algorithm increases the length of GZip and GIF samples, and does not substantially
decrease the length of JPEG samples. This result is reasonable because compressed data
comprises the majority of files within those file types.
Table 4.4: NCD classifier training corpus model statistics
Mean Length Standard Deviation
GZip 1043.2 25.4
JPEG 1015.9 132.1
PDF 921.8 255.7
Microsoft Word 430.0 305.0
Markup 450.2 120.4
Text 437.7 126.2
PostScript 397.3 173.1
GIF 1025.6 112.9
Code 649.9 146.9
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Table 4.4 also indicates that Microsoft Word documents have the largest standard
deviation in compression size. Word documents may contain other file formats, like GIF
and JPEG. Word documents that consist largely of those file types compress little.
The largest compression length is 1047 B, and 11% of training samples compress
to this length. The smallest compression length is 29 B, and 0.5% of training samples
compress to this length. Samples from all types compressed to these distances. These
results suggest that the classifier may have difficulty, and that future iterations of the
research should consider selecting longer training data sections.
4.2.4 Decision Tree
Figure 4.10 depicts the decision tree classifier’s model. The trained decision tree
contains only 15 leaves, indicating that it is unlikely to have over-fit the data. Its size
also suggests that information gain (IG) feature selection results in a feature set which
characterizes the training set well.
Notably, 99.8% of the AVR samples (all but 24 of 10799) contain the byte string
0xEBCD4040, and no code for other architectures contains this string. This byte string is
the most frequently used leaf in the decision tree. The string corresponds to an relative
jump followed by a subtraction from register r20. The byte string occurs as the first four
bytes, and again throughout, most of the AVR files.
The second most frequently used leaf is where byte string 0x0000004E is present,
and the tree classifies files as Motorola 68000 in that case. This decision path captures
95.9% of Motorola 68000 samples, all but 427 of 10430. Binaries in the corpus frequently
contained this byte string as the result of a jump, then a register OR with 0x00 (effectively
a no-operation instruction), then a jump.
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Root
EBCD4040 is present: AVR
EBCD4040 is absent
4E800020 is present: PowerPC
4E800020 is absent
10402DE9 is present: ARM
10402DE9 is absent
D08DE2F0 is present: ARM
D08DE2F0 is absent
0000EBCD is present: AVR
0000EBCD is absent
A64E8004 is present: PowerPC
A64E8004 is absent
1EFF2FE1 is present: ARM
1EFF2FE1 is absent
0000A0E3 is present
FFFFFF3C is present: Motorola 68000
FFFFFF3C is absent: ARM
0000A0E3 is absent
0000004E is present: Motorola 68000
0000004E is absent
EBCD4060 is present: AVR
EBCD4060 is absent
04E02DE5 is present: ARM
04E02DE5 is absent
FFFFEB00 is present: ARM
FFFFEB00 is absent
00009421 is present: PowerPC
00009421 is absent: Motorola 68000
Figure 4.10: Decision tree classifier model
The decision tree’s third most frequently used leaf is where string 0x4E800020 is
present, classifying a sample as PowerPC. The classifier uses this leaf for 99.3% of
PowerPC samples, all but 57 of 7952. The byte string corresponds with the PowerPC blr
opcode. The opcode branches to the address in the link register, unconditionally. PowerPC
code generally places the return address for a subroutine in the link register, making blr
effectively a return statement [30].
Figure 4.10 classifies 91.1% of ARM binaries (all but 632 of 7140) with leaf
0x10402DE9, the tree’s fourth most frequently used leaf. This byte string corresponds with
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a push, placing the contents of both register four and the link register on the stack. This
byte string frequently occurs in the function preamble, pushing those register contents, only
to pop them before returning from the function. The link register, specifically, contains the
return address for the function. ARM code frequently executes a branch to the link register
contents immediately after retrieving them with a pop.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 depict the decision tree leaf use on the training and test sets
respectively. Each dot represents a leaf node, and dot area corresponds to the number of
samples the classifier assigns to that leaf as Table 4.5 gives. Each dot’s caption specifies
the leaf node byte string, and whether the leaf corresponds to the presence or absence of
that byte string with the letters p and a respectively. The largest dots correspond with the
leaves this section discusses. Corresponding dots in both diagrams are less than 0.2%
different, indicating that the decision tree’s performance on both sets is similar. The
research randomly assigns the test and training corpus from a larger corpus. Similar dot
size indicates that, for both test and training corpus, random assignment selects similar
proportions of files characterized by each decision tree branch.
EBCD4040(p)
4E800020(p)
10402DE9(p)
D08DE2F0(p)
0000EBCD(p)
A64E8004(p)
1EFF2FE1(p)
FFFFFF3C(p)
FFFFFF3C(a)
0000004E(p)
EBCD4060(p)
04E02DE5(p)
FFFFEB00(p)
00009421(p)
00009421(a)
Figure 4.11: Decision tree leaf use on the training set
EBCD4040(p)
4E800020(p)
10402DE9(p)
D08DE2F0(p)
0000EBCD(p)
A64E8004(p)
1EFF2FE1(p)
FFFFFF3C(p)
FFFFFF3C(a)
0000004E(p)
EBCD4060(p)
04E02DE5(p)
FFFFEB00(p)
00009421(p)
00009421(a)
Figure 4.12: Decision tree leaf use on the test set
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Table 4.5: Decision tree leaf use on the test and training set
Leaf Training Test Leaf Training Test
EBCD4040 (Present) 10775 2020 FFFFFF3C (Absent) 38 5
4E800020 (Present) 7898 1477 0000004E (Present) 10005 1878
10402DE9 (Present) 6509 1220 EBCD4060 (Present) 2 0
D08DE2F0 (Present) 437 81 04E02DE5 (Present) 10 1
0000EBCD (Present) 19 5 FFFFEB00 (Present) 8 2
A64E8004 (Present) 24 5 00009421 (Present) 2 1
1EFF2FE1 (Present) 104 25 00009421 (Absent) 488 95
FFFFFF3C (Present) 2 0 Total 36321 6815
4.3 Classifier Accuracies
This section presents the results of executing each classifier independently. Table 4.6
describes the test set for the file type classifiers. The test set consists of files from the full
file corpus, which Table 3.1 describes. The test set comprises 15% of corpus files from each
file type, and the training set, described by Table 4.3, comprises another 80% of the corpus
files from each type. A cross-validation set comprises the remaining 5% of corpus files,
and is excluded from the training and testing sets. The test, training, and cross-validation
sets are mutually disjoint.
4.3.1 Fileprints
Table 4.7 depicts the Fileprints classifier producer accuracies. Highlighted cells in the
confusion matrix indicate correct matches. Fileprints’ overall accuracy, for this test set, is
71.3%. Fileprints performs better on this system’s critical file types, the Code file types.
For these types the overall accuracy is 95.6%. Accuracy on non-Code file types is 52.5%.
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Table 4.6: Test set characteristics
File type File Count Total Data (MB) Average File Size (kB)
GZip 67 32.9 502.4
JPEG 524 49.0 95.8
PDF 265 163.3 630.9
Microsoft Word 399 140.8 361.3
Markup 1883 142.9 77.7
Text 566 145.6 263.4
PostScript 103 190.8 1897
GIF 223 16.7 76.8
ARM 1340 153.9 117.6
Motorola 68000 1957 170.2 89.1
AVR 2026 148.9 75.2
PowerPC 1492 209.7 143.9
The system passes Code sections on to a further classifier, so Code file type accuracy during
the file type classification stage is critical.
Table 4.7 reveals that Fileprints performs poorly with PDFs, classifying them as GZip
or JPEG in 71.5% of test cases. Random file type assignment results in an expected
producer accuracy of 11.1% in this test. In all cases except PDF Fileprints performs better
than simple random assignment. Fileprints also performs poorly when classifying Text
files, ascribing the PostScript type in 64.6% of test cases.
Fileprints performs relatively well on JPEG and GZip, but Fileprints’ most common
misclassification on these file types is to swap them. Table 4.7 indicates that Fileprints
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Table 4.7: Producer accuracy confusion matrix for the Fileprints classifier
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GZip .942 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .022 .001
JPEG .155 .763 .002 .008 .003 .005 .000 .058 .006
PDF .438 .277 .090 .003 .020 .052 .052 .063 .006
Microsoft Word .300 .097 .000 .408 .112 .010 .001 .052 .020
Markup .000 .000 .000 .000 .808 .130 .061 .000 .000
Text .000 .000 .000 .000 .124 .230 .646 .000 .000
PostScript .000 .000 .000 .001 .039 .129 .831 .000 .000
GIF .066 .045 .001 .003 .000 .000 .000 .875 .009
ARM .003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .993
Motorola 68000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .001 .984
AVR .007 .001 .003 .067 .007 .004 .001 .048 .862
PowerPC .000 .000 .001 .027 .000 .000 .000 .001 .971
frequently mixes up GZip, JPEG, PDF, and Microsoft Word files. This misclassification is
due partly to the relatively large variance in each fileprint, as Section 4.2.1 describes.
The consumer accuracy confusion matrix in Table 4.8 further confirms that Fileprints
performs well regarding the Code file types. Of all data the classifier identifies as Code
only 0.5% is not actually code, but is Microsoft Word or PDF data. Notably, the classifier
identifies more PDF data as GZip and JPEG than GZip and JPEG data respectively. It also
identifies more Word data as GZip than GZip data, but to a lesser extent. Additionally, it
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identifies a relatively large amount of markup and PostScript data as Text, a large amount
of text data as PostScript, and a large amount of PDF data as GIF.
Table 4.8: Consumer accuracy confusion matrix for the Fileprints classifier
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GZip .200 .011 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .017 .000
JPEG .049 .381 .006 .005 .001 .003 .000 .066 .000
PDF .461 .460 .948 .006 .020 .096 .032 .237 .001
Microsoft Word .272 .139 .003 .745 .098 .016 .001 .169 .004
Markup .000 .000 .000 .001 .716 .212 .032 .000 .000
Text .000 .000 .000 .000 .112 .384 .348 .000 .000
PostScript .000 .000 .000 .003 .046 .282 .587 .000 .000
GIF .007 .008 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .339 .000
ARM .003 .000 .001 .005 .000 .000 .000 .002 .233
Motorola 68000 .000 .000 .001 .033 .000 .000 .000 .004 .255
AVR .007 .001 .030 .129 .007 .006 .000 .164 .195
PowerPC .000 .000 .009 .073 .000 .000 .000 .003 .310
Table 4.9 provides an overview of Fileprints’ performance, and consists of data from
the highlighted cells of Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Table 4.9 indicates that the PDF file type’s
large consumer accuracy is due to the classifier identifying very little data as PDF. This
result is evident because PDF producer accuracy is low indicating that it identified few
PDFs correctly, yet consumer accuracy is high indicating that 94.8% of all data identified
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as PDF is actually PDF. The Microsoft Word file type result is similar, though not to the
same extent as PDF.
Table 4.9: Fileprints classifier error summary
Producer
Accuracy
Omission
Error
Consumer
Accuracy
Commission
Error
GZip 0.942 0.058 0.200 0.800
JPEG 0.763 0.237 0.381 0.619
PDF 0.090 0.910 0.948 0.052
Microsoft Word 0.408 0.592 0.745 0.255
Markup 0.808 0.192 0.716 0.284
Text 0.230 0.770 0.384 0.616
PostScript 0.831 0.169 0.587 0.413
GIF 0.875 0.125 0.339 0.661
ARM 0.993 0.007 0.233 0.767
Motorola 68000 0.984 0.016 0.255 0.745
AVR 0.862 0.138 0.195 0.805
PowerPC 0.971 0.029 0.310 0.690
4.3.2 File Statistics
The statistical file classifier Conti et al. describe performs with an overall accuracy
of 72.7%, and accuracy among the code file types of 97.4%. The algorithm achieves a
53.6% accuracy with non-code file types. Overall, this system performs slightly better than
Fileprints, beating its accuracy by a small margin in all three cases.
Table 4.10 describes producer accuracy results for this algorithm. The classifier
performs worst with PDFs, classifying more as JPEG than PDF. Fileprints’ performance
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Table 4.10: Producer accuracy confusion matrix for the file statistics classifier
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GZip .569 .320 .076 .005 .000 .000 .001 .016 .013
JPEG .117 .757 .004 .014 .009 .003 .002 .065 .029
PDF .144 .337 .304 .030 .061 .042 .006 .028 .049
Microsoft Word .141 .204 .017 .314 .048 .082 .005 .027 .161
Markup .000 .000 .000 .001 .823 .156 .013 .000 .008
Text .000 .000 .000 .000 .159 .805 .025 .000 .011
PostScript .000 .000 .081 .000 .226 .272 .409 .000 .011
GIF .076 .171 .008 .041 .000 .000 .001 .619 .084
ARM .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .999
Motorola 68000 .000 .004 .000 .011 .003 .003 .000 .001 .978
AVR .003 .004 .003 .025 .006 .011 .002 .003 .944
PowerPC .000 .000 .000 .017 .001 .005 .000 .003 .974
with PDFs is similar, suggesting that PDFs and JPEGs have significant resemblance, at
least in byte distribution. The classifier’s next-worst performance is with Word documents,
classifying 20% as JPEG.
Table 4.11 indicates low consumer accuracy for the JPEG files. 46% of data the
classifier identifies as JPEG is actually PDF, and this result causes the poor JPEG consumer
accuracy. The classifier’s performance on the PDF, Microsoft Word, and JPEG file types
also diminished GIF consumer accuracy. Table 4.12 provides a summary of the statistical
file classifier’s performance, and highlights these effects. Notably, with the Code file types
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Table 4.11: Consumer accuracy confusion matrix for the file statistics classifier
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GZip .269 .078 .035 .003 .000 .000 .000 .023 .001
JPEG .082 .274 .003 .012 .002 .001 .001 .133 .002
PDF .337 .406 .701 .081 .049 .032 .011 .189 .011
Microsoft Word .286 .212 .033 .738 .033 .054 .008 .159 .032
Markup .000 .000 .001 .001 .581 .104 .021 .000 .002
Text .000 .000 .000 .000 .114 .549 .042 .000 .002
PostScript .000 .000 .218 .000 .213 .243 .913 .000 .003
GIF .018 .021 .002 .012 .000 .000 .000 .435 .002
ARM .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .001 .218
Motorola 68000 .000 .004 .001 .030 .002 .003 .001 .010 .237
AVR .007 .004 .006 .061 .004 .008 .003 .021 .200
PowerPC .000 .000 .000 .060 .001 .005 .000 .029 .290
5.5% of data the statistical classifier identifies as Code is not. This value is ten times that
of Fileprints. This difference in consumer accuracy makes the analyst’s job more difficult
when using the statistical classifier.
4.3.3 Normalized Compression Distance
Table 4.13 presents the NCD classifier producer accuracy. For the 9-class classification
problem random guessing produces producer accuracies of 11.1%. In all cases, the NCD
classifier performs worse than random guessing. This may reflect problems with the
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Table 4.12: File statistics classifier error summary
Producer
Accuracy
Omission
Error
Consumer
Accuracy
Commission
Error
GZip 0.569 0.431 0.269 0.731
JPEG 0.757 0.243 0.274 0.726
PDF 0.304 0.696 0.701 0.299
Microsoft Word 0.314 0.686 0.738 0.262
Markup 0.823 0.177 0.581 0.419
Text 0.805 0.195 0.549 0.451
PostScript 0.409 0.591 0.913 0.087
GIF 0.619 0.381 0.435 0.565
ARM 0.999 0.001 0.218 0.782
Motorola 68000 0.978 0.022 0.237 0.763
AVR 0.944 0.056 0.200 0.800
PowerPC 0.974 0.026 0.290 0.710
training samples as Section 4.2.3 describes, or the smaller training corpus the research
uses for this algorithm.
The classifier assigns the PostScript file type to 61% of data, but assigns more than half
of all PostScript data to the Code file type. Table 4.4 indicates that PostScript samples have
a comparatively large ratio of compression length standard deviation to mean, though not
as large as Word documents. Thus, compression length varies more for PostScript files than
for files of any other type, except Microsoft Word. Additionally, Table 3.1 indicates that
PostScript samples make up more of the training corpus, by total data, than any other file
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Table 4.13: Producer accuracy confusion matrix for the NCD classifier
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GZip .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .013 .986 .000 .000
JPEG .000 .004 .002 .000 .000 .149 .842 .000 .002
PDF .000 .015 .002 .029 .001 .018 .864 .003 .068
Microsoft Word .000 .023 .031 .016 .100 .095 .561 .041 .132
Markup .000 .002 .000 .166 .000 .002 .031 .003 .796
Text .000 .024 .000 .396 .000 .000 .002 .211 .366
PostScript .000 .077 .003 .273 .000 .000 .000 .107 .539
GIF .000 .001 .000 .001 .001 .129 .867 .000 .000
ARM .000 .000 .018 .000 .013 .022 .947 .000 .000
Motorola 68000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .014 .032 .953 .000 .000
AVR .000 .001 .005 .005 .012 .047 .908 .004 .019
PowerPC .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .050 .929 .000 .000
type except code. The large proportion of training samples and wide range of compression
lengths may make it too difficult for the NCD classifier to succeed.
Table 4.14 provides the consumer accuracy, and shows that the classifier assigns Word
documents to every type except Word. Table 4.15 provides the error summary results, and
shows the classifier is less than 5% accurate, in all cases, on this test set.
The NCD classifier requires 7.6 days to classify the test corpus, while Fileprints and
the statistical classifier require 3.5 days each. The NCD classifier can perform only one
out of three compressions during the training phase, the other two require the test sample.
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Table 4.14: Consumer accuracy confusion matrix for the NCD classifier
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GZip .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .008 .034 .000 .000
JPEG .000 .009 .010 .000 .001 .137 .043 .000 .000
PDF .000 .099 .040 .034 .004 .056 .148 .008 .037
Microsoft Word .893 .132 .489 .016 .572 .252 .083 .098 .062
Markup .078 .009 .002 .167 .002 .005 .005 .008 .376
Text .000 .142 .000 .408 .001 .001 .000 .527 .176
PostScript .000 .593 .074 .369 .001 .001 .000 .349 .340
GIF .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .041 .015 .000 .000
ARM .002 .002 .304 .000 .080 .065 .153 .000 .000
Motorola 68000 .009 .001 .001 .000 .100 .102 .171 .000 .000
AVR .019 .009 .077 .005 .070 .132 .142 .010 .009
PowerPC .000 .003 .002 .000 .170 .199 .205 .000 .000
During testing NCD performs 2nm compressions, where n is the number of test samples
and m is the number of training samples.
This research reduces the NCD classifier run time by randomly selecting a subset of
the training corpus. A more effective approach uses a clustering algorithm to find samples
which best represent a class. Such an algorithm is a research project in itself, and this thesis
does not consider the problem.
If this research applied the whole training corpus to the NCD classifier, classification
would have required approximately 76 days. In practice, this time requirement is too long,
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Table 4.15: NCD classifier error summary
Producer
Accuracy
Omission
Error
Consumer
Accuracy
Commission
Error
GZip 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
JPEG 0.004 0.996 0.009 0.991
PDF 0.002 0.998 0.040 0.960
Microsoft Word 0.016 0.984 0.016 0.984
Markup 0.000 1.000 0.002 0.998
Text 0.000 1.000 0.001 0.999
PostScript 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
GIF 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
ARM 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Motorola 68000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
AVR 0.019 0.981 0.009 0.991
PowerPC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
and it hinders firmware analysis. The Fileprints and statistical classifiers permit model
calculation in advance, so training time does not impact firmware analysis. After training
they require comparatively little time to classify a sample.
4.3.4 Code Classifiers
The decision tree and SVM classifiers perform well overall, with overall accuracies
greater than 99%. Their overall errors were 5.12 × 10−3 and 1.85 × 10−5 respectively.
Table 4.16 displays the code classifier errors in detail. The code classifier accuracies are so
high that error provides a more accurate picture. In several instances the code classifiers
are 100% accurate.
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Table 4.16: Code classifier omission and commission errors
Omission Error Commission Error
Decision Tree SVM Decision Tree SVM
ARM 2.26 × 10−2 1.12 × 10−7 0 0
Motorola 68000 0 0 7.41 × 10−5 7.41 × 10−5
AVR 8.44 × 10−5 8.44 × 10−5 0 0
PowerPC 1.46 × 10−7 1.46 × 10−7 1.60 × 10−2 0
4.4 Whole Pipeline
This section considers the combined accuracy of the binary image segmenter, file type
classifier, and code architecture classifier. These form the second, third, and fourth blocks
in Figure 3.1. Table 4.17 summarizes the accuracy of the system’s entire machine learning
pipeline. Data points in the table are the accuracy result of a specific file type classifier
and code architecture classifier. This research classified a set of 3,000 pseudo-firmwares
with the Fileprints and statistical classifiers, and 1,000 pseudo-firmwares with the NCD
classifier. In all cases, the 95% confidence interval has a width smaller than 3.2 percentage
points. The combination of Fileprints and SVM, as segment type and code type classifiers
respectively, produces the best overall accuracy.
During firmware analysis, however, analysts are likely to value correct identification
of code segments higher than correct identification of other segments. The combination
of the statistical and SVM classifiers produces the best code identification accuracy. The
NCD classifiers perform poorly all around, performing worse than random guessing in all
cases, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
The Fileprints and statistical classifier accuracies conflict, somewhat, with this
chapter’s earlier results. The test set for Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 consists of whole files,
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Table 4.17: Overall accuracy summary, and 95% confidence interval
Fileprints Statistical NCD
Decision Decision Decision
File Type Tree SVM Tree SVM Tree SVM
Non-Code .577 ± .016 .577 ± .016 .323 ± .013 .323 ± .013 .004 ± .001 .004 ± .001
Code .817 ± .012 .827 ± .012 .846 ± .011 .858 ± .010 .039 ± .005 .040 ± .005
Overall .607 ± .014 .609 ± .014 .381 ± .013 .383 ± .013 .005 ± .001 .005 ± .001
while this section uses a pseudo-firmware test set. Section 3.4 describes the construction
of pseudo-firmwares, which approximate true firmwares. The test set difference causes this
section’s accuracy values to differ from those in earlier sections.
The consumer accuracy of the code segment classifications is also likely to concern
analysts. One might focus analysis only on firmware sections classified as code segments,
and in that case a higher consumer accuracy gives the analyst less data to sift through. For
the Fileprints/SVM combination, the consumer accuracy of the code file types pooled is
86.7%. For the statistical/SVM combination the same consumer accuracy value is 66.2%.
The values are significantly different because the statistical classifier incorrectly identifies
4.2% of non-code data as code, while the Fileprints classifier only did so for 0.8%.
This research uses the Fileprints/SVM combination for firmware reverse engineering
because of the superior code segment consumer accuracy and overall producer accuracy.
The statistical/SVM classifier combination realizes a better code segment producer
accuracy, but the difference is small compared to the advantage of Fileprints/acSVM.
Table 4.18 details the system producer accuracies. In all cases, the 95% confidence
interval is smaller than 5.4 percentage points. For non-code file types, results are the same
regardless of code classifier because the code classifier does not consider segments that the
68
system identifies as non-code. The non-code file type results are similar to those in earlier
sections, but percentages differ because the Table 4.18 results use the pseudo-firmware test
set.
Table 4.18: Producer accuracy summary by file type, and 95% confidence interval
Fileprints Statistical NCD
Decision Decision Decision
File Type Tree SVM Tree SVM Tree SVM
GZip .769 ± .011 .769 ± .011 .049 ± .006 .049 ± .006 .000 ± .000 .000 ± .000
JPEG .590 ± .022 .590 ± .022 .658 ± .017 .658 ± .017 .005 ± .003 .005 ± .003
PDF .166 ± .013 .166 ± .013 .092 ± .009 .092 ± .009 .001 ± .001 .001 ± .001
Word .447 ± .025 .447 ± .025 .339 ± .020 .339 ± .020 .021 ± .006 .021 ± .006
Markup .612 ± .024 .612 ± .024 .480 ± .022 .480 ± .022 .016 ± .007 .016 ± .007
Text .234 ± .027 .234 ± .027 .660 ± .025 .660 ± .025 .006 ± .004 .006 ± .004
PostScript .735 ± .022 .735 ± .022 .389 ± .020 .389 ± .020 .031 ± .008 .031 ± .008
GIF .750 ± .018 .750 ± .018 .335 ± .022 .335 ± .022 .004 ± .003 .004 ± .003
ARM .762 ± .022 .828 ± .018 .809 ± .019 .884 ± .014 .030 ± .009 .035 ± .009
Motorola .733 ± .022 .739 ± .023 .805 ± .017 .812 ± .018 .246 ± .024 .247 ± .024
AVR .659 ± .022 .639 ± .022 .730 ± .020 .710 ± .020 .057 ± .014 .047 ± .012
PowerPC .821 ± .018 .805 ± .019 .827 ± .017 .813 ± .017 .035 ± .011 .035 ± .010
The full system results enable detailed analysis of the confusion of each code file
type, where the earlier sections pool the code file types. The Fileprints/SVM combination
classifies less than 9% of ARM code incorrectly, in the worst case identifying 3% of
ARM code as GIF. The system classifies 6% of Motorola 68000 code as Word, and
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3% of PowerPC code as GIF. For all three architectures the system has no other type
misclassifications greater than 2%.
Of the code file types, the Fileprints/SVM combination shows the worst performance
with AVR. It classifies 11% of AVR code as Motorola, and 2% total as ARM or PowerPC.
Thus, the system classifies 80% of AVR code as Code, though it gets the architecture wrong
nearly 1 time out of 6. In practice, this observation suggests that the system would identify
the majority of code and apply the correct architecture, giving an analyst a strong hint as to
the correct architecture. The system labels 9% of AVR code as GIF, 5% as Word document,
and a further 3% as PDF or GZip.
Considering consumer accuracies, 20% of data the system identifies as Motorola
68000 code is actually Word document. As Table 4.6 shows, the average Word document
size is four times that of Motorola files, and the random firmware generator includes
amounts of data proportional to file size. Consequently, the number of Word document
bytes in the pseudo-firmwares is approximately four times that of Motorola 68000 bytes.
Some analysis reveals that this proportion of documentation to code is uncharacteristic
of real firmwares, and in this case the pseudo-firmwares do not adequately model real
firmwares. The 20% value is a consequence of the poor accuracy of Fileprints on Word
documents, and the disproportionate amount of Word document bytes to Motorola 68000
bytes.
4.5 Opcode Analysis
After finding a likely match for a code section’s architecture, the system disassembles
that section. Disassembly must start at the correct byte offset, and in the firmware image
byte offsets are arbitrary. The system does not automatically detect code offsets, instead
disassembling code sections at all likely offsets for the identified architecture. For each of
the architectures this research considers, the system tries offsets of zero, one, two, and three
bytes.
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In practice, each disassembly produces a different set of partially-valid code, and the
correct disassembly is not obvious. The analyst must manually consider each disassembly
and determine which is correct. Appendix A illustrates the difficulty of determining the
correct disassembly by providing four disassemblies of a small code section.
Opcode frequency analysis is one method for assisting in the process. The system
automates this process by determining the frequency of all opcodes in each disassembly. It
then orders the opcodes by frequency, and compares the list to one from other binaries of
that architecture. It annotates the ordered list by marking those opcodes that comprise 90%
of other binaries. Those opcodes generally appear more frequently in correct disassemblies
than in incorrect disassemblies. Appendix A provides a portion of the opcode analysis
from a real firmware, and illustrates how an analyst uses that data to determine the correct
disassembly.
Table 4.19 presents the results of analyzing 100 Executable and Linkable Format
(ELF) binaries from each of this research’s four architectures. Each ELF comes from the
test and training corpus described in Section 3.4. Appendix B presents the most frequent
100 opcodes from each architecture, along with frequency values.
Table 4.19: Most frequent opcodes from four architectures
ARM PowerPC
Opcode Description Opcode Description
ldr Load word lwz Load word and zero
mov Move mr Move register
add Add stw Store word
bl Branch and link bl Branch and link
str Store addi Add
cmp Compare li Load
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b Unconditional branch b Branch
beq Conditional branch cmpwi Compare
bx Branch and exchange beq Conditional branch
andeq Conditional and mtctr Move
sub Subtract bne Conditional branch
bne Conditional branch nop No operation
ldrb Load mflr Move
push Push bctrl Unconditional branch
pop Pop blr Unconditional branch
lsl Shift left mtlr Move
ldm Load multiple bctr Unconditional branch
strb Store byte stwu Store word
movne Conditional move lis Add
subs Subtract rlwinm Rotate word left then And
add Add
cmpw Compare
stfd Store
addis Add
Motorola 68000 AVR
Opcode Description Opcode Description
movel Move sbc Subtract with carry
moveal Move-aligned sbci Subtract with carry
bsrl Branch to subroutine rjmp Relative jump
addql Add quick ori Or
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lea Load effective address cpi Compare
clrl Clear ldd Load indirect
pea Push effective address cp Compare
tstl Test operand ldi Load
moveq Move quick sub Subtract
beqs Conditional branch rcall Call subroutine
unlk Unlink subi Subtract
cmpl Compare andi And
rts Return from subroutine add Add
moveml Move multiple or Or
beqw Conditional branch mul Multiply unsigned
braw branch std Store indirect
jsr Jump to subroutine cpc Compare with carry
bral Branch in Input from I/O
addl Add adc Add with carry
jmp Jump out Output to I/O
bnes Conditional branch mov Move
moveb Move nop No operation
lsll Left shift eor Exclusive or
bras Branch ld Load
linkw Link sbis Conditional skip
bnew Conditional branch cbi Clear bits
subql Subtract quick muls Multiply signed
fmoved Move
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Table 4.19 provides a description for the most frequent opcodes that comprise
90% of each architecture’s opcodes. These opcodes fall into four categories based on
how the compiler generally employs them. Figure 4.13 depicts the proportions each
category comprises for each architecture. Notably, for each architecture approximately
25% of instructions are control instructions like branch or jump. For the Motorola
68000 architecture, over 40% of instructions were move-like instructions (movel, moveal,
moveq...).
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Figure 4.13: Proportions of opcode type
4.6 Firmware Disassembly
While the classifier’s performance on test sets is encouraging, the true goal of
the system is to disassemble real-world firmwares. This section presents the results
of disassembling several Allen-Bradley firmwares. The results from disassembling real
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firmwares validate this research’s results from pseudo-firmwares. Allen-Bradley includes
each within a firmware update tool containing approximately 190 firmware-like binary
images. Three categories describe the firmware contents, as Table 4.20 shows. This section
details the contents of one firmware from categories one and two, specifically the bold
firmwares in Table 4.20.
Table 4.20: Categorization of firmware contents
Category Firmwares
PPC & ZLib 99449204, 99472767, PN-20032, 99472769,
99469405
ARM & ZLib PN-20028, PN-19989, 99502404, 99482558
PN-20008, PN-50978, PN-20017, PN-50984
ARM Only 99502504, PN-19990
4.6.1 PPC & ZLib - Firmware 99449204.bin
Firmwares in the PPC & ZLib category consist of a binary image with short data and
code segments followed by a large, nearly 800 kB, ZLib-compressed segment. The ZLib
segment consists of code for PowerPC architecture central processing units (CPUs). With
the exception of 99469405.wbn, PPC & ZLib firmwares also contain a File Allocation
Table (FAT) file system. Firmware 99469405.wbn is 960 kB, while the other PPC & ZLib
firmwares are between 1.6 MB and 1.8 MB. Peck and Peterson document their disassembly
of the PPC & ZLib firmware 99472767.wbn [48].
The directory that contains firmware image 99449204.bin contains two other files.
One contains only four bytes, and provides no immediate insights into the firmware
contents. The other, 99449204.nvs, is a configuration file for the firmware update tool.
It contains a line that reveals the destination hardware’s identity as 1788-ENBT. The
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1788-ENBT is an Ethernet daughtercard for FlexLogix Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs) providing Internet Protocol (IP) over Ethernet.
With its default settings, Foremost extracts 78 files from the firmware binary.
Table 4.21 summarizes Foremost’s results. Of the 33 bitmap files Foremost reveals, nine
are valid bitmaps and the remainder only contained part of the bitmap header. Foremost
extracts 19 valid GIF images. All valid bitmap and GIF images are small icons, likely for
use within a webpage. Microsoft Windows executables that Foremost produces are only
portions of the binary file that contain the common MZ magic number, but are not actually
Windows executables.
Foremost extracts 15 HyperText Markup Language (HTML) documents. Each
references several GIF images with names matching the contents of the GIF files Foremost
produces. These documents form a website displaying status information for the Ethernet
interface. The website displays Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Domain Name
System (DNS), and basic network configuration properties. It references Javascript files
containing a simple client-side Javascript API to retrieve settings dynamically. Foremost
output does not include the Javascript files.
Table 4.21: Summary of Foremost output for the firmware
File Type Produced Valid
Bitmap 33 9
GIF 19 19
HTML 15 15
Windows Executable 11 0
Listing the strings within the firmware reveals copyright messages from 2004,
error, and status messages, but also the strings “Dhrystone Benchmark, Version 2.1”
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and “VxWorks 5.5, Mar 31 2005, 11:29:31”. These strings suggest that the firmware
incorporates the popular Dhrystone CPU benchmark [75], and that some component of
the firmware comes from the VxWorks 5.5 embedded operating system [76].
The Firmware Disassembly System identifies and outputs one ZLib-compressed
section and 16 non-compressed sections within the firmware. Table 4.22 summarizes
the system’s results, and compares them to a manual inspection of the firmware’s results.
The system completed firmware analysis in 100 seconds on a consumer-grade laptop with
4 GB random-access memory (RAM) and a dual-core 2.3 GHz CPU. The large PowerPC
and Motorola sections, within the system’s results, indicate byte-ranges that merit further
analysis.
Bytes 0 through 56904 contain three general sections. The first is a header with ASCII
text copyright statements, but otherwise unknown content. The largest section contains
binary data which disassembles into plausible assembly code for the PowerPC architecture.
Bytes 96774 through 113907 likewise disassemble into plausible PowerPC assembly code
when the disassembler uses an offset of two bytes.
The firmware code sections lack any clear metadata, and this makes choosing
the correct section disassembly difficult. Disassembly requires correct specification of
architecture and code byte offset. Both requirements are difficult to identify because
most byte values resolve to an opcode in the four architectures this research considers.
Comparing opcode frequency with the training set gives some clue as to whether a
particular disassembly is correct. Also, correct code disassembly generally produces a
large number of cross-references within the code. These two techniques provide an analyst
some insight into a disassembly’s correctness.
The Firmware Disassembly System correctly identifies a ZLib-compressed section
consisting of bytes 113907 through 889823. It automatically uncompresses this section and
performs analysis on it recursively. Uncompressed, the section requires 1.9 MB, but much
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Table 4.22: Contents of firmware 99449204.bin
Firmware Disassembly System Manual Inspection
Byte Range Size (B) Assigned Byte Range Actual
0-55044 55044 PowerPC 0-1400 File header
1400-7960 Zero Padding
7960-56904 PowerPC
55044-91740 36696 Motorola 56904-96774 Zero Padding
91740-110088 18348 Word 96774-113907 PowerPC
110088-113907 3819 PowerPC
113907-889823 775916 ZLib 113907-889823 ZLib
889823-1559580 669757 Motorola 889823-1572630 0xFF Padding
1559580-1577928 18348 PDF 1572630-1834774 FAT12 Filesystem
1577928-1596276 18348 Word
1596276-1651320 55044 Markup
1651320-1669668 18348 Motorola
1669668-1688016 18348 Word
1688016-1706364 18348 GIF
1706364-1761408 55044 Motorola
1761408-1779756 18348 Word
1779756-1798104 18348 Motorola
1798104-1816452 18348 Word
1816452-1834774 18322 PDF
of it consists of padding bytes 0xFF and 0x00. The entire compressed section contains
PowerPC code and associated data sections.
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Analysis reveals a common 16 B symbol table pattern, starting at byte offset
0x001CF91C. Figure 4.14 shows a portion of the symbol table. Four bytes identify the
address of a string containing a function name, then four bytes identify the address of the
corresponding function. Byte eleven contains either 0x05, 0x07 or 0x09, and only lines
containing 0x05 correspond with a function definition. The other seven bytes are always
0x00. The addresses in the symbol table assume a code offset of 0x00100000, thus this
value is the correct loading offset for the PowerPC code. Figure 4.14 depicts the symbol
table at the correct loading offset, where it starts at byte offset 0x002CF91C.
Figure 4.14: Symbol table contained in firmware 99449204.bin
The symbol table provides names for the majority of functions IDA Pro identifies. The
resulting disassembly, with correct code offset, has a dense function call graph. Figure 4.15
shows several named function calls within the function UsrInit. Function names ease
code analysis, and in this case suggest that the function performs some part of the system
initialization. The Firmware Disassembly System does not identify the symbol table as
such, but does identify it as a section separate from the PowerPC code. This automatic
analysis simplifies firmware analysis overall.
Near the symbol table, the PowerPC code data section contains two small GZip
sections. The first uncompresses to a 216 B, 32x32 pixel Windows icon resembling the
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Figure 4.15: Code from the function UsrInit
1788-ENBT Ethernet card. The second is an Allen-Bradley electronic data sheet (EDS)
network configuration file, providing basic information about the Ethernet card.
4.6.2 ARM & ZLib - Firmware PN-20028.bin
ARM & ZLib firmwares begin with an ARM code segment, then contain between two
and fourteen compressed files, then end with multiple short data segments separated by
0x00 or 0xFF padding bytes. Each firmware is between 1.4 MB and 1.9 MB in size, and
the ARM segment comprises between 1.2 and 1.8 MB.
At least two configuration files, with the .nvs file extension, refer to firmware
PN-20028.bin. They indicate that it targets both the 1769-L32E and 1769-L32C devices.
Both devices are communications modules for CompactLogix PLCs [54]. The .nvs files
indicate that firmwares PN-20032.bin and PN-20030.bin target devices 1769-L32E and
1769-L32C respectively. Firmware PN-20032 is a PPC& ZLib firmware, and this research
does not investigate firmware PN-20030.
Foremost produces one JPEG and one bitmap (BMP) file. The JPEG file contains the
magic number 0xFFD8FF, while the BMP file contains the magic number BM. Neither file
is a valid image, they contain sections of binary data that include JPEG and BMP magic
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numbers. Listing the strings within the firmware produces device names, error messages,
source file names, and the compiler name. The device names are consistent with this
section’s analysis. Strings reveal that the code is C or C++, and the compiler toolkit is
the ARM Developer Suite version 1.2, released in November 2001 [6].
Table 4.23 describes the Firmware Disassembly System output and the results of
manual firmware inspection. The firmware’s strings suggest that it contains code for ARM
architecture processors, and the Firmware Disassembly System output indicates that ARM
code comprises the majority of the firmware. The ARM code sections merit further analyst
attention. Additionally, the system suggests that a zero byte offset results in correct code
disassembly.
Table 4.23: Contents of firmware PN-20028.bin
Firmware Disassembly System Manual Inspection
Byte Range Size (B) Assigned Byte Range Actual
0-1538024 1538024 ARM 0-1744908 ARM
1538024-1541673 3649 Word
1541673-1555908 14235 PowerPC
1555908-1573792 17884 GIF
1573792-1627444 53652 Motorola
1627444-1663212 35768 ARM
1663212-1744908 81696 Word
1744908-1756829 11921 16 ZLib Files 1744908-1756829 16 ZLib Files
1756829-1781248 24419 Word 1756829-1788344 Sparse binary data,
unknown format
1781248-1785924 4676 Motorola
1785924-1788344 2420 ARM
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Manual analysis does not reveal a symbol table, and therefore does not resolve the
code’s function names or the code’s loading address. Fortunately, this firmware’s function
calls use relative addressing, and IDA Pro automatically determines the location of many
of the firmware’s functions. After automatic analysis IDA Pro leaves few byte ranges
unexplored. Figure 4.16 shows a portion of the code diagram IDA Pro generated. The
majority of unexplored sections contain data or padding, but manual analysis reveals some
code within those sections.
Figure 4.16: A portion of the IDA Pro code diagram for PN-20028.bin
Firmware PN-20028.bin contains fourteen compressed sections, and the Firmware
Disassembly System correctly identifies each. Seven compressed sections are EDS files,
and seven are Windows icons resembling PLC components. EDS files contain ASCII text
that describes the configuration properties of a device [55]. They assist operators during
network configuration.
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4.6.3 ARM Only
The ARM Only firmwares are similar to the ARM & ZLib firmwares, but only
contain an ARM code section. Additionally, ARM Only firmwares are smaller. Both are
approximately 170 kB. IDA Pro’s automatic analysis identifies many function entry points,
as it did for ARM & ZLib firmwares.
4.6.4 Strengths and Weaknesses
This exercise reveals some strengths and weaknesses of the current iteration of the
Firmware Disassembly System. The system significantly reduces the time required for
firmware analysis by automatically identifying relevant sections. It automatically identifies
the architecture of code sections and disassembles them. The system automatically finds
compressed sections within the firmware and recursively analyzes them.
Unfortunately, the Firmware Disassembly System performs poorly when it encounters
sections filled with padding. Padding bytes 0x00 and 0xFF cause the system to identify
sections as Motorola 68000 code. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 summarize the system’s
performance on firmwares 99449204.bin and PN-20028.bin, respectively. The system
misidentifies each padding byte range, in Figure 4.17, as Motorola 68000. This
misclassification only slightly hinders analysis efforts, as the system’s error is evident
upon brief inspection. Figure 4.18 contains no padding byte ranges because firmware
PN-20028.bin only contains small padding segments. The file segmenter includes those
small padding segments within larger segments, which the system then misclassifies as
Word as Table 4.23 shows. Future iterations of the Firmware Disassembly System may
address the padding section misclassification by finding large sections of padding bytes
and removing them prior to further analysis.
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Figure 4.17: Summary of system performance on firmware 99449204.bin
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Figure 4.18: Summary of system performance on firmware PN-20028.bin
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5 Conclusions
This research described the algorithms comprising the Firmware Disassembly System,
a tool to assist analysts with PLC firmware disassembly. The system found compressed
sections, determined the file type of byte ranges within the firmware, automatically
disassembled likely code sections, and provided opcode frequency analysis for human
reference. The process required machine learning algorithms, and the majority of this
research involved selecting those algorithms.
The machine learning algorithms that identified firmware segment file types required
firmware segments upon which to operate. Section 4.1 analyzed the performance of four
file segmenting algorithms. Two were variations on a sliding window, and two used a
measure of instantaneous file entropy. The sliding window algorithms outperformed the
entropy algorithms, both in speed and accuracy. Consequently, the Firmware Disassembly
System segmented files with a sliding window. Specifically, it divided files into 100
segments, or 512 B segments, whichever are larger.
Identifying the file type of byte ranges is similar to a technique called file carving, so
this research applied three file carving algorithms to the problem. One algorithm considered
four statistical features of each sample, while another used normalized compression
distance. This research revealed that the most successful file carving algorithm for this
problem was Fileprints. Fileprints models file types as the mean and variance of byte-value
frequency in the training set. On a 10,845 file test corpus consisting of 9 classes of file
type, Fileprints achieved a 71.3% accuracy overall, and a 95.6% accuracy when identifying
executable code segments.
After the file type classifier identifies the file type of each segment, another machine
learning algorithm must identify the architecture and endianness of the code segments. This
research applied two malware identification algorithms to the code classification problem.
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Both algorithms applied information gain to byte-value 4-grams to identify classification
attributes. One used a decision tree classifier, and the other used an SVM classifier. The
SVM classifier produced the best results, achieving better than 99% accuracy.
The Firmware Disassembly System employed the Fileprints and SVM classifiers.
This research applied the system to a set of pseudo-firmwares. The system achieved
57.7% accuracy with non-code segments, 82.7% accuracy with code segments, and 60.9%
accuracy overall. The relatively high code segment accuracy indicates that the system
provides analysts with accurate information regarding code location and architecture.
After evaluating the machine learning classifiers, Section 4.5 identified opcode
frequency for the four most-common PLC processor architectures. These results assist
firmware disassembly by giving the analyst an indicator if a particular disassembly is valid.
The research identified the opcodes that comprise 90% of code for each architecture, or
approximately 20 opcodes for each. The Firmware Disassembly System employed these
results to automate some disassembly analysis.
Finally, this research analyzed several Allen-Bradley PLC firmwares to validate the
experimental methodology. Three categories described the firmwares. Firmwares in the
first category contained a large ZLib-compressed section, and all but one contained a FAT12
filesystem. The compressed section contained PowerPC code. Firmwares in the second and
third categories contained ARM processor code, and second category firmwares contained
several compressed configuration and icon file sections.
5.1 Limitations
The Firmware Disassembly System performs poorly on padding-byte sections,
classifying them as Motorola 68000 code. Every validation firmware contains padding
sections, and incorrect classification makes firmware analysis more difficult. A future
iteration of the system should screen out padding sections before further analysis.
Additionally, while the system’s 85.3% accuracy on code sections is reasonable, future
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iterations of the system must improve the 60.1% overall performance. Finally, the system
only incorporates three common firmware compression algorithms. Some firmwares likely
include data using other compression schemes, although this research found none.
5.2 Future Work
Several possibilities exist for future work with this system. One major hurdle that
remains during firmware analysis is identifying a code segment’s loading address. The
loading address is critical to reverse engineering when code contains jumps or branches
using absolute addressing. In that case, an analyst cannot build a function call graph
without the loading address. The loading address also enables analysts to resolve code
references to data. This research leveraged information in a symbol table, and found
a symbol table format common to at least two Allen-Bradley PowerPC PLC firmwares.
Future research might determine how common that symbol table format is, and might
identify common symbol table formats for other architectures. Manufacturers may strip
symbol tables out of firmwares before distribution, so future research should consider
other techniques for determining loading address. One such technique considers switch
conditional jump tables. Future research might investigate this method further, identifying
common jump table formats for different architectures.
This research only applied five machine learning algorithms to the reverse engineering
problem. The NCD classifier performed poorly, and future research might investigate ways
to improve its performance to better match Axelsson’s results [7]. This research found
that the code classification algorithms performed well, and future research might apply the
decision tree and SVM algorithms to the file type identification problem. Future research
might consider simplifying the system block structure by combining the file type and code
architecture classification steps. Unfortunately, the information gain attribute selection
technique incurs a time/memory tradeoff that made application to the 9-class file type
problem infeasible for this research. Future research might consider eliminating some of
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the file types, or might combine multiple types into logical groups. Each of these research
avenues has the potential to improve the system’s overall classification accuracy.
The Firmware Disassembly System’s analysis ends with code disassembly. Future
research might expand the system, applying existing static code analysis techniques to
automate vulnerability discovery. Future research might examine techniques to compare
pristine firmware to forensically-recovered firmware. Both techniques would significantly
aid analysis of rogue firmwares, the true use case of this system. Many obstacles exist to
PLC firmware dynamic code analysis, and hardware emulation in particular, and it is also
fertile ground for future research.
The Firmware Disassembly System process applies to firmwares in general, and not
just PLC firmwares. Future research might apply a similar system to printer firmwares,
or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) networking hardware firmwares. The security of both
device classes is relatively unexplored, yet devices from both classes are present on many
networks. Insecure printer and networking hardware firmware might act as a network back
door, or a launching point for other network attacks.
Finally, future work should automate the process of finding malicious and buggy
code within firmwares. This research designed the Firmware Disassembly System as a
preprocessor for that future system. The larger system might apply existing code analysis
tools to the code sections that the Firmware Disassembly System reveals. Automated
malware and bug detection tools would enable a firmware clearing house capable of
validating firmware security prior to installation, and would speed reaction by a critical
infrastructure (CI) computer emergency response team (CERT). Such a system would
eventually reduce CI vulnerabilities, and improve CI reliability.
Recent increases in CI system network connectivity, and advances in attacker
knowledge of firmware, necessitate faster firmware reverse engineering techniques. This
thesis applied machine learning algorithms to the firmware reverse engineering problem,
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then developed a reverse engineering process, and implemented that process in the
Firmware Disassembly System. Critically, the Firmware Disassembly System’s automatic
disassembly and analysis permitted quick identification of PLC firmware target architecture
without possessing the PLC. The system automatically identified sections that merit
further analysis, while limiting the amount of distracting extraneous output. The Firmware
Disassembly System automatically uncompressed all firmware components and produced
the assembly-language code comprising a firmware. It completed this tedious process
considerably faster than other techniques. The combination of these qualities make the
Firmware Disassembly System unique.
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Appendix A: Disassembly at Four Offsets
For the four architectures this research considers, bytes representing code have at least
four potential disassemblies. These correspond to initial byte offsets of zero, one, two,
or three bytes. This appendix illustrates the difficulty inherent in choosing the correct
disassembly. It provides four disassemblies of the same code section from firmware
PN-20032, one disassembly for each offset. Firmware PN-20032 contains PowerPC code.
Each disassembly for this code section contains bytes that do not resolve as valid opcodes,
and each contains bytes that do resolve as valid opcodes. This fact makes it difficult for an
analyst to immediately determine the correct disassembly. The correct disassembly results
from a three byte offset.
This appendix also provides the first twenty entries in the Firmware Disassembly
System’s opcode analysis results for each disassembly. A preponderance of popular
opcodes within a disassembly provides an analyst with a quick indicator of that
disassembly’s correctness. An opcode is popular when it is part of the group of opcodes
that comprise 90% of an architecture’s code. Table 4.19 gives the popular opcodes for
each architecture. The most frequent opcodes in offset three’s analysis are all popular, and
this is not the case for the other disassemblies. This correctly suggests that the correct
disassembly results from a three byte offset.
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Table A.1: Offset zero disassembly
Address Byte Values Disassembly Result
2c9c8: a0 be 5c 00 lhz r5,23552(r30)
2c9cc: 00 03 fd 83 .long 0x3fd83
2c9d0: 2b f4 a6 d9 cmpli cr7,1,r20,42713
2c9d4: 86 7e 2a 00 lwzu r19,10752(r30)
2c9d8: 00 03 fe 89 .long 0x3fe89
2c9dc: 2a ec df de cmpli cr5,1,r12,57310
2c9e0: 95 47 b5 00 stwu r10,-19200(r7)
2c9e4: 00 03 fe 8f .long 0x3fe8f
2c9e8: 00 5d 5e f7 .long 0x5d5ef7
2c9ec: f5 9f 9b 00 .long 0xf59f9b00
2c9f0: 00 03 fe 94 .long 0x3fe94
2c9f4: ac 72 c9 84 lhau r3,-13948(r18)
2c9f8: 71 86 f6 00 andi. r6,r12,62976
2c9fc: 00 03 fe 9a .long 0x3fe9a
2ca00: 2f 80 e6 71 cmpwi cr7,r0,-6543
2ca04: bd da 20 00 stmw r14,8192(r26)
2ca08: 00 03 fe 9f .long 0x3fe9f
2ca0c: 89 fd c4 f4 lbz r15,-15116(r29)
2ca10: b7 a1 ed 00 sthu r29,-4864(r1)
2ca14: 00 03 fe a4 .long 0x3fea4
2ca18: bc 7d 19 34 stmw r3,6452(r29)
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Table A.2: Offset one disassembly
Address Byte Values Disassembly Result
2c9c8: be 5c 00 00 stmw r18,0(r28)
2c9cc: 03 fd 83 2b .long 0x3fd832b
2c9d0: f4 a6 d9 86 .long 0xf4a6d986
2c9d4: 7e 2a 00 00 cmp cr4,1,r10,r0
2c9d8: 03 fe 89 2a .long 0x3fe892a
2c9dc: ec df de 95 .long 0xecdfde95
2c9e0: 47 b5 00 00 .long 0x47b50000
2c9e4: 03 fe 8f 00 .long 0x3fe8f00
2c9e8: 5d 5e f7 f5 rlwnm. r30,r10,r30,31,26
2c9ec: 9f 9b 00 00 stbu r28,0(r27)
2c9f0: 03 fe 94 ac .long 0x3fe94ac
2c9f4: 72 c9 84 71 andi. r9,r22,33905
2c9f8: 86 f6 00 00 lwzu r23,0(r22)
2c9fc: 03 fe 9a 2f .long 0x3fe9a2f
2ca00: 80 e6 71 bd lwz r7,29117(r6)
2ca04: da 20 00 00 stfd f17,0(0)
2ca08: 03 fe 9f 89 .long 0x3fe9f89
2ca0c: fd c4 f4 b7 .long 0xfdc4f4b7
2ca10: a1 ed 00 00 lhz r15,0(r13)
2ca14: 03 fe a4 bc .long 0x3fea4bc
2ca18: 7d 19 34 f7 .long 0x7d1934f7
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Table A.3: Offset two disassembly
Address Byte Values Disassembly Result
2c9c8: 5c 00 00 03 rlwnm. r0,r0,r0,0,1
2c9cc: fd 83 2b f4 .long 0xfd832bf4
2c9d0: a6 d9 86 7e lhzu r22,-31106(r25)
2c9d4: 2a 00 00 03 cmplwi cr4,r0,3
2c9d8: fe 89 2a ec .long 0xfe892aec
2c9dc: df de 95 47 stfdu f30,-27321(r30)
2c9e0: b5 00 00 03 sthu r8,3(0)
2c9e4: fe 8f 00 5d .long 0xfe8f005d
2c9e8: 5e f7 f5 9f rlwnm. r23,r23,r30,22,15
2c9ec: 9b 00 00 03 stb r24,3(0)
2c9f0: fe 94 ac 72 .long 0xfe94ac72
2c9f4: c9 84 71 86 lfd f12,29062(r4)
2c9f8: f6 00 00 03 .long 0xf6000003
2c9fc: fe 9a 2f 80 .long 0xfe9a2f80
2ca00: e6 71 bd da .long 0xe671bdda
2ca04: 20 00 00 03 subfic r0,r0,3
2ca08: fe 9f 89 fd fnmsub. f20,f31,f7,f17
2ca0c: c4 f4 b7 a1 lfsu f7,-18527(r20)
2ca10: ed 00 00 03 .long 0xed000003
2ca14: fe a4 bc 7d fnmsub. f21,f4,f17,f23
2ca18: 19 34 f7 09 .long 0x1934f709
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Table A.4: Offset three disassembly
Address Byte Values Disassembly Result
2c9c8: 00 00 03 fd .long 0x3fd
2c9cc: 83 2b f4 a6 lwz r25,-2906(r11)
2c9d0: d9 86 7e 2a stfd f12,32298(r6)
2c9d4: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2c9d8: 89 2a ec df lbz r9,-4897(r10)
2c9dc: de 95 47 b5 stfdu f20,18357(r21)
2c9e0: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2c9e4: 8f 00 5d 5e lbzu r24,23902(0)
2c9e8: f7 f5 9f 9b .long 0xf7f59f9b
2c9ec: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2c9f0: 94 ac 72 c9 stwu r5,29385(r12)
2c9f4: 84 71 86 f6 lwzu r3,-30986(r17)
2c9f8: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2c9fc: 9a 2f 80 e6 stb r17,-32538(r15)
2ca00: 71 bd da 20 andi. r29,r13,55840
2ca04: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2ca08: 9f 89 fd c4 stbu r28,-572(r9)
2ca0c: f4 b7 a1 ed .long 0xf4b7a1ed
2ca10: 00 00 03 fe .long 0x3fe
2ca14: a4 bc 7d 19 lhzu r5,32025(r28)
2ca18: 34 f7 09 24 addic. r7,r23,2340
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Table A.5: Offset zero opcode analysis
Opcode Opcode Is
Popular
Frequency in
disassembly
lwz True 0.2386
ori False 0.1144
subfic False 0.1033
mulli False 0.0828
lhz False 0.0579
lfs False 0.0530
xori False 0.0429
cmplwi False 0.0305
lis True 0.0299
stbu False 0.0231
lwzu False 0.0190
stmw False 0.0179
bl True 0.0145
stfdu False 0.0121
lhzu False 0.0118
lfsu False 0.0100
lbz False 0.0088
oris False 0.0086
b True 0.0080
cmpli False 0.0079
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Table A.6: Offset one opcode analysis
Opcode Opcode Is
Popular
Frequency in
disassembly
rlmi False 0.0644
subfic False 0.0580
addic False 0.0533
addis True 0.0473
rlwimi False 0.0424
stfd True 0.0409
lwz True 0.0402
cmpli False 0.0295
addi True 0.0267
lfs False 0.0243
stfs False 0.0242
b True 0.0236
lwzu False 0.0218
stfsu False 0.0211
ori False 0.0200
bl True 0.0186
twi False 0.0182
lbzu False 0.0175
lfd False 0.0175
ba False 0.0169
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Table A.7: Offset two opcode analysis
Opcode Opcode Is
Popular
Frequency in
disassembly
subfic False 0.0857
addic False 0.0707
lhzu False 0.0619
mulli False 0.0520
cmpwi True 0.0514
dozi False 0.0458
addi True 0.0310
cmpli False 0.0307
cmpi False 0.0307
addis True 0.0275
rlwimi False 0.0275
vaddubm False 0.0243
twlgti False 0.0206
cmplwi False 0.0202
tweqi False 0.0189
twi False 0.0145
stfs False 0.0137
ori False 0.0132
lwz True 0.0124
rlwinm True 0.0123
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Table A.8: Offset three opcode analysis
Opcode Opcode Is
Popular
Frequency in
disassembly
lwz True 0.1477
stw True 0.0915
mr True 0.0838
li True 0.0768
addi True 0.0680
bl True 0.0613
lis True 0.0546
cmpwi True 0.0494
beq True 0.0464
b True 0.0344
bne True 0.0276
rlwinm True 0.0197
lbz False 0.0165
mtlr True 0.0161
ori False 0.0139
blr True 0.0136
lhz False 0.0124
add True 0.0110
cmpw True 0.0105
or False 0.0101
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Appendix B: Opcode Frequency Analysis
This appendix lists the results of the opcode frequency analysis for 100 ELF binaries
from each of four architectures. Opcode frequency for a particular file is given by
Equation B.1. In each table, mean frequency and variance measure the mean and variance
of the opcode frequencies for individual files. Pooled frequency is from all binaries
considered as one file.
opcode frequency =
number of occurrences of an opcode within a file
total opcodes in the file
(B.1)
B.1 ARM Opcodes
Table B.1: Top 100 opcodes for ARM
Mnemonics Pooled Frequency Mean Frequency Variance
ldr 0.204 0.204 0.012
mov 0.176 0.151 5.460 × 10−3
add 0.096 0.075 2.796 × 10−3
bl 0.087 0.062 2.962 × 10−3
str 0.072 0.068 1.613 × 10−3
cmp 0.061 0.054 8.199 × 10−4
b 0.032 0.027 2.924 × 10−4
beq 0.030 0.031 4.513 × 10−4
bx 0.024 0.031 8.370 × 10−4
andeq 0.024 0.017 4.724 × 10−4
sub 0.020 0.016 4.595 × 10−4
bne 0.019 0.014 1.069 × 10−4
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ldrb 0.012 0.015 3.959 × 10−4
push 0.011 0.011 6.938 × 10−5
pop 0.011 0.010 5.694 × 10−5
lsl 6.797 × 10−3 4.503 × 10−3 5.574 × 10−5
ldm 6.160 × 10−3 3.808 × 10−3 9.832 × 10−5
strb 4.328 × 10−3 2.939 × 10−3 2.253 × 10−5
movne 4.201 × 10−3 2.998 × 10−3 9.699 × 10−6
subs 4.128 × 10−3 2.883 × 10−3 1.383 × 10−5
mvn 3.726 × 10−3 2.678 × 10−3 1.481 × 10−5
rsb 3.715 × 10−3 2.462 × 10−3 1.347 × 10−5
orr 3.701 × 10−3 2.818 × 10−3 8.505 × 10−5
moveq 3.688 × 10−3 2.694 × 10−3 1.259 × 10−5
and 3.510 × 10−3 2.664 × 10−3 3.248 × 10−5
ldreq 2.564 × 10−3 2.435 × 10−3 1.240 × 10−5
ldrne 2.559 × 10−3 2.337 × 10−3 6.801 × 10−6
ble 2.529 × 10−3 1.729 × 10−3 7.280 × 10−6
lsr 2.253 × 10−3 1.638 × 10−3 1.295 × 10−5
bgt 2.186 × 10−3 1.584 × 10−3 5.758 × 10−6
tst 2.184 × 10−3 1.503 × 10−3 6.701 × 10−6
stm 2.118 × 10−3 1.416 × 10−3 5.763 × 10−6
strdeq 2.043 × 10−3 1.501 × 10−3 3.900 × 10−6
blt 1.901 × 10−3 1.435 × 10−3 5.566 × 10−6
muleq 1.862 × 10−3 1.304 × 10−3 3.746 × 10−6
ldrdeq 1.817 × 10−3 1.290 × 10−3 3.524 × 10−6
cmn 1.795 × 10−3 1.209 × 10−3 8.513 × 10−6
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blne 1.599 × 10−3 1.165 × 10−3 4.849 × 10−6
ldrh 1.519 × 10−3 1.013 × 10−3 8.812 × 10−6
asr 1.504 × 10−3 9.891 × 10−4 4.699 × 10−6
strne 1.503 × 10−3 1.423 × 10−3 3.116 × 10−6
bhi 1.333 × 10−3 9.040 × 10−4 3.734 × 10−6
strh 1.283 × 10−3 8.581 × 10−4 4.988 × 10−6
streq 1.216 × 10−3 8.834 × 10−4 5.139 × 10−6
bic 1.198 × 10−3 1.185 × 10−3 4.174 × 10−6
bls 1.189 × 10−3 8.940 × 10−4 1.858 × 10−6
bleq 1.162 × 10−3 9.505 × 10−4 8.655 × 10−6
eor 1.122 × 10−3 8.317 × 10−4 1.394 × 10−5
bge 9.826 × 10−4 6.821 × 10−4 1.410 × 10−6
addne 9.023 × 10−4 6.169 × 10−4 1.027 × 10−6
addeq 8.209 × 10−4 6.386 × 10−4 3.628 × 10−6
adds 7.523 × 10−4 5.253 × 10−4 2.269 × 10−6
bcs 7.497 × 10−4 7.877 × 10−4 1.119 × 10−6
bcc 7.177 × 10−4 5.925 × 10−4 8.695 × 10−7
mul 7.094 × 10−4 4.603 × 10−4 1.549 × 10−6
cmpne 5.966 × 10−4 3.885 × 10−4 7.388 × 10−7
stmia 5.899 × 10−4 4.184 × 10−4 2.881 × 10−6
orrs 5.773 × 10−4 4.530 × 10−4 9.063 × 10−7
movcc 5.649 × 10−4 3.952 × 10−4 4.613 × 10−7
adc 5.278 × 10−4 3.698 × 10−4 1.933 × 10−6
stmdbhi 4.899 × 10−4 5.436 × 10−4 2.087 × 10−5
ldrsh 4.872 × 10−4 3.026 × 10−4 2.260 × 10−6
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ands 4.834 × 10−4 3.518 × 10−4 7.610 × 10−7
bxne 4.589 × 10−4 3.537 × 10−4 4.679 × 10−7
teq 4.428 × 10−4 3.752 × 10−4 7.475 × 10−7
movle 4.333 × 10−4 2.861 × 10−4 2.997 × 10−7
movge 4.090 × 10−4 2.691 × 10−4 2.542 × 10−7
movgt 4.070 × 10−4 2.585 × 10−4 3.130 × 10−7
movlt 4.066 × 10−4 2.769 × 10−4 4.069 × 10−7
subeq 4.022 × 10−4 3.944 × 10−4 4.182 × 10−6
movcs 3.967 × 10−4 3.225 × 10−4 5.857 × 10−7
rsbs 3.799 × 10−4 2.877 × 10−4 2.493 × 10−7
mla 3.712 × 10−4 2.215 × 10−4 8.882 × 10−7
stmdami 3.647 × 10−4 4.138 × 10−4 1.184 × 10−5
svceq 3.487 × 10−4 4.284 × 10−4 1.248 × 10−5
blhi 3.468 × 10−4 3.883 × 10−4 1.051 × 10−5
stmib 3.290 × 10−4 2.600 × 10−4 2.620 × 10−7
svccc 3.258 × 10−4 2.343 × 10−4 7.766 × 10−7
bxeq 3.074 × 10−4 2.475 × 10−4 6.612 × 10−7
subcs 3.061 × 10−4 2.532 × 10−4 2.705 × 10−7
strgt 2.957 × 10−4 2.606 × 10−4 1.846 × 10−6
mvneq 2.517 × 10−4 2.118 × 10−4 1.170 × 10−6
lsrs 2.498 × 10−4 1.965 × 10−4 1.748 × 10−7
movls 2.483 × 10−4 1.735 × 10−4 1.290 × 10−7
orrne 2.436 × 10−4 1.677 × 10−4 2.580 × 10−7
ldrls 2.403 × 10−4 1.660 × 10−4 2.027 × 10−7
strbeq 2.377 × 10−4 1.950 × 10−4 3.793 × 10−7
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strhi 2.352 × 10−4 2.384 × 10−4 2.755 × 10−6
movhi 2.345 × 10−4 1.620 × 10−4 1.136 × 10−7
orrcs 2.337 × 10−4 1.928 × 10−4 1.599 × 10−7
addls 2.314 × 10−4 1.616 × 10−4 1.840 × 10−7
lsls 2.292 × 10−4 1.867 × 10−4 2.174 × 10−7
ldmmi 2.264 × 10−4 2.505 × 10−4 4.588 × 10−6
stmdb 2.263 × 10−4 2.549 × 10−4 4.096 × 10−6
strbne 2.158 × 10−4 1.513 × 10−4 1.356 × 10−7
ldmib 2.112 × 10−4 1.900 × 10−4 2.008 × 10−7
eoreq 2.035 × 10−4 1.972 × 10−4 1.994 × 10−6
teqne 1.871 × 10−4 1.583 × 10−4 1.435 × 10−7
strheq 1.858 × 10−4 1.487 × 10−4 3.757 × 10−7
addgt 1.830 × 10−4 1.456 × 10−4 3.793 × 10−7
B.2 Motorola 68000 Opcodes
Table B.2: Top 100 opcodes for Motorola 68000
Mnemonics Pooled Frequency Mean Frequency Variance
movel 0.290 0.116 0.022
moveal 0.097 0.039 2.939 × 10−3
bsrl 0.085 0.033 2.701 × 10−3
addql 0.049 0.019 7.870 × 10−4
lea 0.042 0.017 4.936 × 10−4
clrl 0.034 0.013 3.987 × 10−4
pea 0.033 0.014 4.710 × 10−4
tstl 0.024 9.106 × 10−3 1.986 × 10−4
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moveq 0.022 8.523 × 10−3 1.823 × 10−4
beqs 0.019 7.651 × 10−3 1.304 × 10−4
unlk 0.017 7.406 × 10−3 1.381 × 10−4
cmpl 0.017 6.295 × 10−3 9.822 × 10−5
rts 0.016 6.928 × 10−3 1.238 × 10−4
moveml 0.015 6.180 × 10−3 8.564 × 10−5
beqw 0.015 5.324 × 10−3 7.299 × 10−5
braw 0.014 5.177 × 10−3 7.327 × 10−5
jsr 0.013 5.442 × 10−3 2.790 × 10−4
bral 0.012 5.905 × 10−3 1.091 × 10−4
addl 0.011 3.964 × 10−3 6.882 × 10−5
jmp 0.011 5.215 × 10−3 8.536 × 10−5
bnes 0.010 4.275 × 10−3 4.674 × 10−5
moveb 0.010 4.059 × 10−3 1.182 × 10−4
lsll 8.356 × 10−3 2.905 × 10−3 6.086 × 10−5
bras 8.014 × 10−3 3.162 × 10−3 4.045 × 10−5
linkw 7.836 × 10−3 3.549 × 10−3 3.739 × 10−5
bnew 7.716 × 10−3 2.838 × 10−3 2.253 × 10−5
subql 7.580 × 10−3 3.095 × 10−3 3.782 × 10−5
fmoved 5.470 × 10−3 1.685 × 10−3 9.437 × 10−5
cmpal 5.320 × 10−3 2.119 × 10−3 2.496 × 10−5
subl 4.893 × 10−3 1.706 × 10−3 1.713 × 10−5
movew 4.224 × 10−3 1.472 × 10−3 4.281 × 10−5
addal 4.215 × 10−3 1.451 × 10−3 1.467 × 10−5
fmoves 3.371 × 10−3 1.063 × 10−3 9.187 × 10−5
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tstb 3.016 × 10−3 1.239 × 10−3 8.426 × 10−6
addil 2.805 × 10−3 1.173 × 10−3 1.843 × 10−5
btst 2.727 × 10−3 1.012 × 10−3 1.071 × 10−5
moveaw 2.153 × 10−3 8.146 × 10−4 6.159 × 10−6
fmovex 2.146 × 10−3 6.701 × 10−4 1.437 × 10−5
cmpib 2.129 × 10−3 8.261 × 10−4 7.520 × 10−6
andl 2.050 × 10−3 8.185 × 10−4 9.215 × 10−6
clrb 2.050 × 10−3 8.056 × 10−4 4.084 × 10−6
subal 1.981 × 10−3 7.194 × 10−4 3.034 × 10−6
blts 1.937 × 10−3 7.093 × 10−4 3.400 × 10−6
bltw 1.803 × 10−3 6.025 × 10−4 2.238 × 10−6
cmpil 1.516 × 10−3 5.862 × 10−4 3.454 × 10−6
mulsl 1.498 × 10−3 4.490 × 10−4 3.865 × 10−6
orl 1.493 × 10−3 5.255 × 10−4 4.140 × 10−6
asrl 1.478 × 10−3 5.490 × 10−4 3.028 × 10−6
bles 1.465 × 10−3 5.410 × 10−4 2.239 × 10−6
faddx 1.436 × 10−3 4.326 × 10−4 9.728 × 10−6
extbl 1.395 × 10−3 5.095 × 10−4 1.696 × 10−6
andil 1.376 × 10−3 5.504 × 10−4 4.371 × 10−6
blew 1.148 × 10−3 4.061 × 10−4 1.316 × 10−6
bges 1.118 × 10−3 4.301 × 10−4 1.393 × 10−6
fsglmuls 1.065 × 10−3 2.869 × 10−4 1.258 × 10−5
fmuld 1.052 × 10−3 3.372 × 10−4 5.071 × 10−6
fmulx 1.010 × 10−3 3.152 × 10−4 4.181 × 10−6
lsrl 9.938 × 10−4 3.779 × 10−4 2.267 × 10−6
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clrw 9.822 × 10−4 3.339 × 10−4 2.638 × 10−6
bgtw 9.809 × 10−4 3.689 × 10−4 1.566 × 10−6
bgew 9.770 × 10−4 3.315 × 10−4 7.113 × 10−7
fsubx 9.406 × 10−4 2.630 × 10−4 4.472 × 10−6
negl 9.012 × 10−4 3.287 × 10−4 8.185 × 10−7
fmovel 8.524 × 10−4 3.191 × 10−4 1.930 × 10−6
bccs 8.229 × 10−4 3.250 × 10−4 9.875 × 10−7
bccw 7.345 × 10−4 2.710 × 10−4 6.021 × 10−7
bgts 7.191 × 10−4 2.791 × 10−4 6.290 × 10−7
fmovemx 6.675 × 10−4 2.461 × 10−4 8.501 × 10−7
faddd 6.475 × 10−4 2.254 × 10−4 2.218 × 10−6
swap 6.415 × 10−4 2.239 × 10−4 2.316 × 10−6
bfextu 5.953 × 10−4 2.509 × 10−4 1.930 × 10−6
subxl 5.892 × 10−4 1.955 × 10−4 7.172 × 10−7
eorl 5.607 × 10−4 2.185 × 10−4 6.544 × 10−6
rolw 5.584 × 10−4 1.844 × 10−4 6.293 × 10−6
bcsw 5.436 × 10−4 1.984 × 10−4 3.320 × 10−7
bcss 5.086 × 10−4 1.995 × 10−4 3.123 × 10−7
bhiw 4.905 × 10−4 1.826 × 10−4 6.445 × 10−7
bhis 4.900 × 10−4 2.383 × 10−4 7.891 × 10−7
cmpiw 4.871 × 10−4 1.893 × 10−4 1.432 × 10−6
fsglmulx 4.868 × 10−4 1.300 × 10−4 3.698 × 10−6
fadds 4.711 × 10−4 1.551 × 10−4 3.297 × 10−6
notb 4.599 × 10−4 2.304 × 10−4 2.173 × 10−6
oriw 4.371 × 10−4 1.481 × 10−4 5.150 × 10−7
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fcmpx 4.358 × 10−4 1.343 × 10−4 7.121 × 10−7
sne 4.326 × 10−4 1.704 × 10−4 4.352 × 10−7
negb 4.279 × 10−4 1.675 × 10−4 6.346 × 10−7
fmovecrx 4.260 × 10−4 1.406 × 10−4 5.662 × 10−7
seq 4.242 × 10−4 1.592 × 10−4 2.551 × 10−7
blss 4.167 × 10−4 1.957 × 10−4 5.667 × 10−7
fsubs 3.926 × 10−4 9.743 × 10−5 2.093 × 10−6
fintrzx 3.565 × 10−4 1.383 × 10−4 4.447 × 10−7
fdivx 3.502 × 10−4 1.097 × 10−4 4.614 × 10−7
blsw 3.333 × 10−4 1.206 × 10−4 4.016 × 10−7
addxl 3.116 × 10−4 1.097 × 10−4 5.899 × 10−7
orib 3.044 × 10−4 1.397 × 10−4 2.177 × 10−7
rorl 2.780 × 10−4 8.583 × 10−5 1.655 × 10−6
fcmpd 2.779 × 10−4 8.750 × 10−5 2.563 × 10−7
bclr 2.707 × 10−4 9.441 × 10−5 3.968 × 10−7
notl 2.698 × 10−4 8.058 × 10−5 1.784 × 10−7
bset 2.694 × 10−4 9.131 × 10−5 3.174 × 10−7
B.3 PowerPC Opcodes
Table B.3: Top 100 opcodes for PowerPC
Mnemonics Pooled Frequency Mean Frequency Variance
lwz 0.202 0.111 0.013
mr 0.109 0.047 3.638 × 10−3
stw 0.108 0.068 5.599 × 10−3
bl 0.074 0.034 2.345 × 10−3
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addi 0.073 0.045 2.351 × 10−3
li 0.044 0.023 7.311 × 10−4
b 0.038 0.018 5.380 × 10−4
cmpwi 0.032 0.014 3.524 × 10−4
beq 0.027 0.012 2.235 × 10−4
mtctr 0.026 0.017 4.833 × 10−4
bne 0.020 9.697 × 10−3 1.700 × 10−4
nop 0.019 8.615 × 10−3 1.369 × 10−4
mflr 0.017 9.835 × 10−3 1.552 × 10−4
bctrl 0.013 0.012 4.702 × 10−4
blr 0.013 8.461 × 10−3 1.139 × 10−4
mtlr 0.012 7.778 × 10−3 8.292 × 10−5
bctr 0.012 4.531 × 10−3 7.371 × 10−5
stwu 0.010 7.333 × 10−3 9.559 × 10−5
lis 9.770 × 10−3 0.013 7.895 × 10−4
rlwinm 9.489 × 10−3 3.524 × 10−3 5.770 × 10−5
add 8.205 × 10−3 2.879 × 10−3 5.858 × 10−5
cmpw 8.003 × 10−3 4.084 × 10−3 3.572 × 10−5
stfd 7.871 × 10−3 7.067 × 10−3 2.998 × 10−4
addis 7.860 × 10−3 3.178 × 10−3 3.096 × 10−5
bcl 7.266 × 10−3 2.724 × 10−3 2.729 × 10−5
crclr 6.774 × 10−3 4.746 × 10−3 1.052 × 10−4
lbz 6.136 × 10−3 3.941 × 10−3 1.786 × 10−4
stwcx 4.964 × 10−3 1.825 × 10−3 4.354 × 10−5
lwarx 4.564 × 10−3 1.653 × 10−3 4.216 × 10−5
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stb 4.291 × 10−3 3.280 × 10−3 3.405 × 10−5
lfd 3.448 × 10−3 1.184 × 10−3 2.480 × 10−5
lfs 3.392 × 10−3 1.202 × 10−3 5.700 × 10−5
subf 3.209 × 10−3 1.165 × 10−3 9.922 × 10−6
ble 3.073 × 10−3 1.129 × 10−3 7.246 × 10−6
cmplw 2.683 × 10−3 1.620 × 10−3 1.148 × 10−5
blt 2.656 × 10−3 1.389 × 10−3 7.657 × 10−6
bgt 2.588 × 10−3 1.371 × 10−3 7.484 × 10−6
bge 2.273 × 10−3 1.280 × 10−3 5.075 × 10−6
addic 2.220 × 10−3 1.092 × 10−3 2.152 × 10−5
lwzx 2.023 × 10−3 6.462 × 10−4 1.021 × 10−5
cmplwi 1.807 × 10−3 1.805 × 10−3 2.347 × 10−5
clrlwi 1.786 × 10−3 8.320 × 10−4 1.253 × 10−5
srawi 1.384 × 10−3 4.760 × 10−4 3.472 × 10−6
ori 1.162 × 10−3 5.370 × 10−4 3.536 × 10−6
lhz 1.146 × 10−3 5.335 × 10−4 4.565 × 10−6
andi 1.086 × 10−3 3.824 × 10−4 2.223 × 10−6
fmr 1.062 × 10−3 3.259 × 10−4 6.725 × 10−6
mullw 1.023 × 10−3 2.847 × 10−4 2.326 × 10−6
fsub 1.005 × 10−3 3.247 × 10−4 2.998 × 10−6
sth 9.405 × 10−4 4.463 × 10−4 4.584 × 10−6
or 9.313 × 10−4 2.989 × 10−4 4.820 × 10−6
lwzu 8.468 × 10−4 5.458 × 10−4 1.762 × 10−5
stfs 8.220 × 10−4 2.412 × 10−4 8.398 × 10−6
dozi 7.581 × 10−4 5.424 × 10−4 2.884 × 10−5
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fmul 7.353 × 10−4 2.018 × 10−4 2.158 × 10−6
fcmpu 6.459 × 10−4 1.944 × 10−4 1.237 × 10−6
andis 6.173 × 10−4 3.786 × 10−4 9.402 × 10−6
xoris 6.155 × 10−4 2.820 × 10−4 1.948 × 10−6
subfic 5.699 × 10−4 3.658 × 10−4 9.345 × 10−6
mtcrf 5.698 × 10−4 1.911 × 10−4 3.593 × 10−7
mfcr 5.549 × 10−4 2.314 × 10−4 6.434 × 10−7
twi 5.389 × 10−4 4.331 × 10−4 1.693 × 10−5
stwx 5.047 × 10−4 1.804 × 10−4 4.760 × 10−7
lfsu 5.036 × 10−4 3.590 × 10−4 1.200 × 10−5
bdnz 4.941 × 10−4 1.509 × 10−4 4.702 × 10−7
stmw 4.371 × 10−4 3.858 × 10−4 1.737 × 10−5
xor 4.319 × 10−4 1.609 × 10−4 2.251 × 10−6
lha 4.266 × 10−4 2.248 × 10−4 4.639 × 10−6
isync 4.260 × 10−4 1.851 × 10−4 1.678 × 10−6
bla 4.181 × 10−4 3.057 × 10−4 8.940 × 10−6
fadd 4.175 × 10−4 1.275 × 10−4 1.046 × 10−6
fadds 4.122 × 10−4 5.933 × 10−5 3.736 × 10−6
xori 3.862 × 10−4 1.772 × 10−4 5.411 × 10−7
fmadd 3.835 × 10−4 9.789 × 10−5 8.422 × 10−7
neg 3.727 × 10−4 1.168 × 10−4 3.035 × 10−7
fdiv 3.705 × 10−4 1.137 × 10−4 7.415 × 10−7
rlwimi 3.666 × 10−4 1.698 × 10−4 1.333 × 10−6
fsubs 3.565 × 10−4 5.150 × 10−5 3.237 × 10−6
lbzx 3.494 × 10−4 1.820 × 10−4 9.695 × 10−7
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lwsync 3.489 × 10−4 1.483 × 10−4 1.341 × 10−6
lbzu 3.469 × 10−4 2.509 × 10−4 4.184 × 10−6
lfdx 3.433 × 10−4 9.182 × 10−5 7.644 × 10−7
oris 3.404 × 10−4 2.281 × 10−4 3.907 × 10−6
fmuls 3.230 × 10−4 5.681 × 10−5 1.146 × 10−6
fmadds 3.022 × 10−4 5.604 × 10−5 1.203 × 10−6
stbx 2.920 × 10−4 9.600 × 10−5 6.106 × 10−7
lmw 2.788 × 10−4 2.261 × 10−4 5.257 × 10−6
subfe 2.762 × 10−4 1.000 × 10−4 2.106 × 10−7
and 2.607 × 10−4 9.626 × 10−5 5.368 × 10−7
fctiwz 2.603 × 10−4 8.791 × 10−5 2.696 × 10−7
extsh 2.263 × 10−4 8.447 × 10−5 2.095 × 10−6
stfdx 2.248 × 10−4 5.552 × 10−5 3.453 × 10−7
cmpi 2.189 × 10−4 1.667 × 10−4 2.691 × 10−6
cntlzw 2.173 × 10−4 7.179 × 10−5 9.951 × 10−8
rotlwi 2.173 × 10−4 7.879 × 10−5 9.542 × 10−7
ba 1.968 × 10−4 1.482 × 10−4 2.053 × 10−6
rlwnm 1.829 × 10−4 1.411 × 10−4 1.811 × 10−6
addze 1.802 × 10−4 6.972 × 10−5 1.433 × 10−7
lhzx 1.748 × 10−4 5.453 × 10−5 1.048 × 10−7
mcrf 1.714 × 10−4 6.664 × 10−5 5.635 × 10−7
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B.4 AVR Opcodes
Table B.4: Top 100 opcodes for AVR
Mnemonics Pooled Frequency Mean Frequency Variance
sbc 0.104 0.087 2.385 × 10−3
sbci 0.065 0.054 9.367 × 10−4
rjmp 0.065 0.054 9.958 × 10−4
ori 0.059 0.049 1.322 × 10−3
cpi 0.054 0.045 5.534 × 10−4
ldd 0.054 0.043 6.339 × 10−4
cp 0.046 0.041 1.398 × 10−3
ldi 0.040 0.031 5.693 × 10−4
sub 0.038 0.032 4.133 × 10−4
rcall 0.037 0.031 3.833 × 10−4
subi 0.036 0.030 2.620 × 10−4
andi 0.035 0.028 3.138 × 10−4
add 0.033 0.028 4.953 × 10−4
or 0.030 0.026 3.344 × 10−4
mul 0.026 0.022 3.080 × 10−4
std 0.024 0.020 1.476 × 10−4
cpc 0.021 0.018 1.791 × 10−4
in 0.018 0.014 1.343 × 10−4
adc 0.018 0.015 2.156 × 10−4
out 0.018 0.015 7.890 × 10−5
mov 0.016 0.014 2.544 × 10−4
nop 0.013 0.012 1.165 × 10−3
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eor 0.013 0.011 5.447 × 10−5
ld 0.013 0.010 5.450 × 10−5
sbis 0.011 9.558 × 10−3 7.980 × 10−5
cbi 0.010 8.018 × 10−3 4.731 × 10−5
muls 9.442 × 10−3 8.021 × 10−3 9.234 × 10−5
and 9.347 × 10−3 7.766 × 10−3 5.623 × 10−5
cpse 9.055 × 10−3 7.506 × 10−3 2.756 × 10−5
sbic 7.840 × 10−3 6.164 × 10−3 2.548 × 10−5
sbi 7.138 × 10−3 5.929 × 10−3 2.624 × 10−5
bld 6.306 × 10−3 5.145 × 10−3 1.895 × 10−5
mulsu 5.309 × 10−3 4.491 × 10−3 4.397 × 10−5
movw 4.265 × 10−3 3.753 × 10−3 3.453 × 10−5
fmuls 4.208 × 10−3 3.677 × 10−3 1.667 × 10−5
brid 3.478 × 10−3 2.845 × 10−3 2.712 × 10−5
bst 3.036 × 10−3 2.418 × 10−3 7.188 × 10−6
sbrc 2.876 × 10−3 2.338 × 10−3 4.079 × 10−6
sbiw 2.459 × 10−3 2.145 × 10−3 1.224 × 10−5
brie 2.177 × 10−3 1.674 × 10−3 1.073 × 10−5
reti 2.175 × 10−3 1.957 × 10−3 8.058 × 10−6
sbrs 2.096 × 10−3 1.753 × 10−3 2.608 × 10−6
brtc 1.586 × 10−3 1.276 × 10−3 7.550 × 10−7
lds 1.362 × 10−3 1.178 × 10−3 1.097 × 10−6
st 1.293 × 10−3 1.035 × 10−3 1.284 × 10−6
brcs 1.125 × 10−3 9.175 × 10−4 7.523 × 10−7
adiw 9.635 × 10−4 7.981 × 10−4 8.986 × 10−7
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brcc 9.431 × 10−4 7.666 × 10−4 5.165 × 10−7
com 9.159 × 10−4 7.624 × 10−4 1.038 × 10−6
brge 8.191 × 10−4 6.825 × 10−4 1.273 × 10−6
brpl 6.745 × 10−4 4.987 × 10−4 1.240 × 10−6
brts 6.722 × 10−4 5.077 × 10−4 5.239 × 10−7
call 6.439 × 10−4 5.019 × 10−4 4.210 × 10−7
lsr 5.972 × 10−4 5.139 × 10−4 7.079 × 10−7
brlt 5.814 × 10−4 4.785 × 10−4 3.682 × 10−7
brmi 5.801 × 10−4 4.453 × 10−4 5.859 × 10−7
breq 5.439 × 10−4 4.308 × 10−4 1.523 × 10−7
lpm 5.237 × 10−4 4.079 × 10−4 3.063 × 10−7
fmulsu 5.087 × 10−4 3.623 × 10−4 4.949 × 10−6
elpm 5.001 × 10−4 3.833 × 10−4 3.070 × 10−7
sez 4.419 × 10−4 4.118 × 10−4 7.592 × 10−7
fmul 4.410 × 10−4 3.721 × 10−4 3.549 × 10−7
brne 4.348 × 10−4 3.451 × 10−4 1.043 × 10−7
sts 4.328 × 10−4 3.529 × 10−4 2.655 × 10−7
pop 4.248 × 10−4 3.735 × 10−4 2.648 × 10−7
brvs 3.635 × 10−4 2.917 × 10−4 9.149 × 10−8
brhs 3.463 × 10−4 2.802 × 10−4 1.144 × 10−7
swap 3.318 × 10−4 2.687 × 10−4 9.724 × 10−8
brvc 3.075 × 10−4 2.424 × 10−4 7.947 × 10−8
brhc 2.478 × 10−4 1.962 × 10−4 1.075 × 10−7
neg 2.477 × 10−4 2.012 × 10−4 8.293 × 10−8
jmp 1.839 × 10−4 1.492 × 10−4 1.047 × 10−7
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dec 1.764 × 10−4 1.541 × 10−4 1.180 × 10−7
inc 1.181 × 10−4 9.001 × 10−5 1.272 × 10−8
push 8.242 × 10−5 6.645 × 10−5 9.349 × 10−9
asr 7.927 × 10−5 6.237 × 10−5 1.677 × 10−8
ror 6.192 × 10−5 4.858 × 10−5 6.359 × 10−9
des 3.839 × 10−5 2.886 × 10−5 2.372 × 10−9
ret 3.434 × 10−5 2.810 × 10−5 4.994 × 10−9
sec 3.327 × 10−5 1.850 × 10−5 3.804 × 10−8
cli 1.864 × 10−5 1.352 × 10−5 2.940 × 10−9
ijmp 1.395 × 10−5 1.111 × 10−5 6.020 × 10−10
spm 3.679 × 10−6 2.804 × 10−6 1.093 × 10−10
eijmp 2.648 × 10−6 1.987 × 10−6 5.490 × 10−10
seh 2.435 × 10−6 1.885 × 10−6 1.051 × 10−10
set 1.635 × 10−6 1.363 × 10−6 2.877 × 10−10
icall 1.564 × 10−6 1.347 × 10−6 6.965 × 10−11
sev 1.351 × 10−6 8.481 × 10−7 6.810 × 10−11
eicall 1.244 × 10−6 1.017 × 10−6 4.951 × 10−11
sen 1.155 × 10−6 1.169 × 10−6 8.271 × 10−11
cls 1.137 × 10−6 9.571 × 10−7 3.885 × 10−11
clt 1.120 × 10−6 8.592 × 10−7 3.774 × 10−11
clv 1.031 × 10−6 7.319 × 10−7 3.336 × 10−11
wdr 9.775 × 10−7 6.419 × 10−7 2.563 × 10−11
clc 9.242 × 10−7 7.735 × 10−7 3.412 × 10−11
clz 9.242 × 10−7 7.356 × 10−7 4.751 × 10−11
sei 9.242 × 10−7 7.487 × 10−7 4.463 × 10−11
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cln 9.064 × 10−7 7.463 × 10−7 6.100 × 10−11
clh 8.531 × 10−7 5.739 × 10−7 2.052 × 10−11
ses 8.531 × 10−7 6.768 × 10−7 3.306 × 10−11
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